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The view taken by the majority of American courts that, in the
absence of restrictive statutory provisions, a solvent corporation may
lawfully purchase its own shares out of capital has been justly and
severely criticized in treatises 1 and law reviews 2 for two generations.
The dangers which are involved in purchases out of capital, and to an
only slightly less extent in purchases out of "capital" surplus, are obvi-
ous enough. Such purchases impair the creditors' margin of safety,
an objection which has peculiar force in those cases in which there are
debenture. holders or other long-term creditors whose risk is a con-
tinuing one. If there are outstanding preferred shares, such purchases
impair the preferred shareholders' margin of safety-and preferred
shareholders, unlike most creditors, are long-term investors in corpo-
rate enterprises. Even if all of the issued shares are common shares,
purchase out of capital reduces, temporarily or permanently, the assets
which are devoted and which the shareholders had reason to expect
would be devoted to the prosecution of the business.
Such purchases are likely to be used to enable influential insiders
to withdraw from shaky corporations. They are likely to be used to
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buy off shareholder-opponents of the management without regard to
whether their opposition is beneficial or harmful to the corporation. If
the shares are listed on an exchange, such purchases are likely to be
made for purposes of market speculation or even of market manipula-
tion.' Although some of these dangerous potentialities are not con-
fined to purchases out of capital or unearned surplus, the objections
to purchases of those types are so numerous and so serious that legal
writers almost without exception have agreed that such purchases, at
least, should be prohibited.
The question is one which no longer needs extended discussion,
at least so far as the problem relates to capital in the strict sense as dis-
tinguished from capital surplus. We shall, therefore, take it for
granted in what follows that the rule is a bad one. It has so few de-
fenders, other than the wearers of judicial robesp that practically all
the statutes which deal with the question at all, including those wnacted
in what are sometimes unkindly referred to as the "charter-monger-
ing" states, reject it. We can with more profit devote our attention
to other questions. How did the rule arise? What is its scope in
those jurisdictions which adhere to it? To what extent has it been
modified by modern corporation statutes both as to ordinary purchases
and as to those which are made pursuant to special terms in the original
subscription, and what are the sanctions by which currently existing
statutory restrictions are enforceable? To what extent are there, or
should there be, legal differences between such purchases and the re-
demption or purchase of shares which are redeemable by virtue of pro-
visions in the corporation's charter?
I. PURCHASE OF SHARES
Origin and Developnent of the So-Called American Rule
The question when, if at all, a corporation may lawfully purchase
its own shares is one on which American authority developed very
slowly. The earliest expression of judicial opinion on the subject
seems to be the dictum in the case of Ex parte Holmes,4 decided by
the Supreme Court of New York in 1826, to the effect that a corpora-
tion may take its own shares in payment of a debt due to it. This case
was followed by some inconclusive remarks on the subject by the Vice-
Chancellor some five years later,5 and by a vigorously expressed dis-
3. For a study of purchases of shares by investment companies and the abuses to
which such purchases have led, see REP. S. E. C., Inv2estment Trusts and Inzvstmext
Companics, Pt. II, 236 et seq., Pt. III, c. III, 211 et seq. For a study of the results
of purchases of shares by eighty large corporations during the period immediately prior
to federal regulation of the security markets, see Holt and Morris, Some Aspects of
Reacquired Treasury Shares, 1931-1933 (934) 12 H.A.v. Bus. Ray. 505.
4- 5 Cow. 426, 434-5 (N. Y. Sup. Ct 1826).
r. Verplank v. Mercantile Ins. Co., i Edw. Ch. 84, 94 (N. Y. z83z).
PURCHASE AND REDEMPTION OF SHARES
approval of an ordinary agreement to purchase by the same Supreme
Court in Barton v. Port Jackson,6 decided in 1854. Four years later
the New York tide turned as a result of a statement in an opinion by
Selden, J., in the New York Court of Appeals that he was not aware
of any common law principle which forbade a corporation to buy its
own shares. This statement subsequently came to be regarded, both in
New York and elsewhere, as aligning that important jurisdiction with
the view that, subject to some ill-defined limitations, the purchase by a
corporation of its own shares is a legitimate corporate act.7
During the period in which the New York courts were handing
down these opinions, the question was also being dealt with to a slight
extent in a number of other jurisdictions. The most significant of
these early cases are: Hartridge v. Rockwell s in which, in holding that
shares purchased by a corporation could be resold, the court expressed
the opinion that the purchase was legally unobjectionable; Percy v.
Millaudon,9 in which directors of a bank who had sold their shares
to it were compelled to refund the purchase price at suit of a share-
holder, the court saying that the purchase reduced the capital and in
consequence injured the creditors, the shareholders and the general
public; and Taylor v. Miami Exporting Co.,10 in which the court, in a
case involving merely the taking of shares in payment of a debt, used
broad language in support of the existence of a general right to pur-
chase.
11
A few favorable 12 and unfavorable dicta Is uttered during the
next forty years were finally followed by what seems to have been the
first square decision in favor of the power to purchase, that of the
Massachusetts court in Dupee v. Boston Water Power Co.14 In that
case the court dismissed a bill for an injunction brought by a share-
holder against his company, which was engaged in filling and grading
tide-flowed lands in order to sell them in lots, and which had offered
to accept its own shares in pa)ment of one-half of the purchase price
of each lot of land sold. During the same decade, the courts of Illi-
6. i7 Barb. 397 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1854).
7. City Bank of Columbia v. Bruce & Fox, 17 N. Y. 507, 5xi (1858), relating to
an Ohio banking corporation.
8. R. M. Charlton 26o (Ga. Super. Ct. 1828).
9. 3 La. 568 (1832).
zo. 6 Ohio 176 x 833).
ii. A few other early cases upheld acquisition by the corporation in payment of a
debt. Williams v. Savage Mfg. Co., 3 Md. Ch. 418 (i85x) ; State Bank of Ohio v.
Fox, 5 Fed. Cas. 632, No. 2683 (C. C. N. D. N. Y. I856). In Farmers' and Mechanics'
Bank v. Champlain Trans. Co., 18 Vt. 131 (i846) it was held that one who had sold his
shares in a bank to it was no longer a shareholder and hence was not disqualified from
testifying in an action to which it was a party.
12. American Railay-Frog Co. v. Haven, 101 Mass. 398, 402 (x869) ; Leland v.
Hayden, 102 Mass. 542, 551 (1869).
13. Coleman v. Columbia Oil Co., 5z Pac. 74 (x865). See also Bedford R. R. v.
Bowser, 48 Pa. 29 (1864).
14. 114 Mass. 37 (1873).
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nois 15 and Iowa 16 took the position that an agreement by a corpora-
tion to purchase its own shares was valid and binding on it. On the
other hand, the courts of New Hampshire 17 and Kansas is held that
such purchases were rescindable by the corporation, so that the nu-
merical weight of the decisions during the ten-year period was only
slightly in favor of the laxer view.
The period from i88o to i89o brought about a temporary turn-
ing of the tide with a decision by the Ohio court 19 limiting the scope
of its previous decision to cases in which the shares were taken in pay-
ment of a debt; one by the Illinois court 20 holding that its earlier
decision in favor of the power to purchase did not mean that the pur-
chase could not be impeached by a creditor where the payment was
made out of capital and the corporation later became insolvent; and
one by the Connecticut court 2 1 holding that purchases made by a cor-
poration whose capital was impaired could be rescinded by a subse-
quently-appointed receiver. The few contemporary cases in which
corporate purchases were more favorably regarded are unimpressive,
22
and the restrictive view received at this time powerful support from
the House of Lords 23 and from Morawetz.
24
Although one who studied the American law of fifty years ago
might have hesitated to predict that the full rigor of the English view,
according to which such purchases were ultra vires, would generally
prevail in this country, he might reasonably have hazarded the opinion
that few, if any, American courts would sustain such purchases against
attack by unpaid creditors, at least where the purchase involved the
depletion of corporate capital. Nevertheless, the subsequent develop-
ment of American case law in the majority of jurisdictions has not
been very favorable to creditors. It is true that, since i89o, several
additional jurisdictions have, with little or no aid from statutes, denied
or greatly restricted a corporation's power to purchase its own shares.23
i_. Chicago, Pekin & South Western R. R. v. Marseilles, 84 IlL 145 (1876), aff'd
on rehearing, 84 II1. 643 (877).
16. Iowa Lumber Co. v. Foster, 49 Iowa 25 (1878). Cf. State ex el. Page v.
Smith, 48 Vt. 266 (1876).
17. Currier v. Slate Co., 56 N. H. 262 (1875).
18. German Savings Bank v. Wulfekuhler, 19 Kan. 6o (1877), relying to some
extent on a statute providing for liability of shareholders for corporate debts to an
amount equal to the par value of their shares.
19. Coppin v. Greenless & Ransome Co., 38 Ohio St. 275 (1882).
20. Clapp v. Peterson, 104 111. 26 (1882).
21. Crandall, Receiver v. Lincoln, 52 Conn. 73 (1884).
22. See, e. g., Vail v. Hamilton, 85 N. Y. 453, 457 (i88i), containing a dictum in
favor of the power to purchase.
23. Trevor v. Vhitworth, 12 A. C. 409 (H. L 1887).
24. MoRAWETZ, PRvAkTE CoPoiLA4Toxs (1st ed. 1882) §§ 230, 231 ; (2d ed. ,886)
§ 112, 113.
25. See, e. g.. 'Maryland Trust Co. v. National 'Mechanics Bank, 102 lid. 6o8, 65
At. 70 (19o6) ; Cartwright v. Dickinson, 88 Tenn. 476, 12 S. W. 1030 (i89o).
In some jurisdictions, decisions denying the existence of corporate power to buy
shares, at least where the purchase is made out of capital, have been influenced by
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But during the period between i890 and the beginning of the move-
ment for modernization of corporation statutes which became active
about the year 1927, a substantially larger number of courts joined
the ranks of those who saw nothing improper in a corporation's use
of its capital for the purchase of its own shares.
26
A number of factors contributed to this result. The prestige of
those American courts which had, as early as 189o, by language or
decision given their approval to such purchases, at least in cases in
which the rights of creditors were not directly at issue, was somewhat
greater than that of the courts which had adopted a stricter view. Fur-
thermore, much of the litigation, both before and after that date, in-
volved the validity not of the purchase but of the reissue of the pur-
chased shares, and casual statements in opinions dealing with the latter
question to the effect that the original purchase was valid were some-
times taken at their face value without regard to the context in which
they were found. Finally, and perhaps most important, it continued
to be true for a good many years after i89o that even the cases in
which the validity of the purchase was directly at issue were, with rare
exceptions, cases to which neither creditors nor representatives of cred-
itors were parties.
When such cases did arise, even the courts which had sustained
the power to make purchases out of capital did not completely ignore
the rights of creditors. Persons whose shares the corporation had
promised to purchase were generally denied the right to enforce that
promise or security given for it in competition with its other creditors
if the corporation was insolvent when the promise was made or be-
came so prior to performance.2 7 One or two courts, however, per-
statutes prohibiting directors from dividing, withdrawing, or paying to shareholders or
any of them, any part of the capital stock, or from reducing the capital except as pro-
vided by law. See Schulte v. Boulevard Gardens Land Co., 164 Cal. 464, 468, i29 Pac.
582, 583 (913) ; Kom v. Cody Detective Agency, 76 Wash. 54o, 136 Pac. 1155 (1913).
For the statutes now in effect in California, Maryland and Tennessee, see notes 39,
40 and 41, infra.
26. See, e. g., Copper Belle lin. Co. v. Costello, ii Ariz. 334, 95 Pac. 94 (x9o8),
rehearinr denied, 12 Ariz. 5, 95 Pac. 803 (i9o8) ; Cole v. Cole Realty Co, i6g Mich.
347, 135 N. W. 329 (1912) ; Gipson v. Bedard, 173 AMinn. 504, 217 N. W. 139 (z927) ;
Fremont Carriage Mfg. Co. v. Thomsen, 65 Neb. 370, 91 N. W. 376 (igo2); Chapman
v. Iron Clad Rheostat Co., 62 N. J. L. 497, 41 AtL 6go (Sup. Ct. x898); Blalock v.
Kernersville ffg. Co., rio N. C. 99, 14 S. E. 501 (i89i); Shoemaker v. Washburn
Lumber Co., 97 Wis. 585, 73 N. W. 333 (1897).
For the statutes now in effect in Michigan and Minnesota, see notes 40 and 41,
infra.
Prior to the enactment of the Business Corporation Act of x933, PA. STAT. AN1i.
(Purdon, 1938) tit. i5, §2852, the Pennsylvania decisions were in accord with the
majority view, at least in cases in which the repurchase agreement w~as a term of the
original subscription. Smith v. Citizens Ins. & Mtg. Co., 284 Pa. 38o, 131 At& i9i
(I92_) ; Wolf v. Excelsior, etc., Co., 270 Pa. 548, 113 At. 569 (192) ; flloway v. Daly,
65 Pa. Super. 333 (ix6). See also PA. STAT. ANSI. (Purdon, 1938) tit. r5, §662,
repealed as to business corporations by the Act of 1933.
27. Boggs v. Fleming, 66 F. (2d) 859 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1933); Coleman v. Tepel, 23o
Fed. 63 (C. C. A. 3d, x916) (in which the corporation gave a bond and mortgage for
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mitted the shareholder even then to compete with subsequent creditors
who had notice of the agreement at the time when they extended
credit.
28
In several cases, the further step was taken of holding that a pay-
ment made by an insolvent corporation as the purchase price of its own
shares may be recovered by or for creditors. 29  Where the entire trans-
action takes place when the corporation is insolvent, payment for the
worthless shares is indubitably a fraudulent conveyance of the assets
which are used to make the payment. The result should not be differ-
ent where an executory contract to purchase its own shares, which
was made by a then solvent corporation, has been performed after
insolvency. If the corporation should expressly stipulate that it would
perform its agreement to purchase its own shares regardless of whether
it continued to be solvent on the date of performance, such an agree-
ment should be held illegal. An agreement to purchase in the future
should, therefore, be treated as an agreement to purchase if, but only
if, the corporation remains solvent.30 There is, however, at least one
case which expresses doubt as to the right of subsequent creditors to
attack such a purchase even though the corporation was, at the time
of the purchase, insolvent in the sense of being unable to pay its debts
as they accrued, and there was no evidence that these creditors ex-
tended credit with knowledge of the purchase3
1
its shares and %as immediately rendered insolvent thereby); Commercial National
Bank v. Burch, 141 Ill. 519, 31 N. E. 42o (1892) ; Barden v. A. Heller Sawdust Co.,
240 Mich. 549, 216 N. W. 464 (1927).
Many of the cases involve agreements made at the time of the original subscrip-
tion. See, e. g, White v. Lorimer's City Dye Works, 46 Idaho 490, 269 Pac. 9o6
(1928) ; McIntyre v. E. Bements Sons, 146 Mich. 74, io9 N. W. 45 (I9O6) (decision
based in part on a statute) ; Hoover Steel Ball Co. v. Schaeffer Ball Bearings Co., 9o
N. J. Eq. z64, io6 AtI. 471 (Ch. ig9) (involving a corporation governed by the New
York statute, but stating that the same result would be reached under the non-statutory
law of New Jersey).
28. First Trust Co. v. Illinois Central Ry., 256 Fed. 83o (C. C. A. 8th, 191g)
(mortgage given by an insolvent railroad to secure bonds issued in exchange for its
shares held valid as against subsequent creditors having constructive notice from the
record of the mortgage). But cf. Loveland v. Doernbecher Mfg. Co., 149 Ore. 8, 39
P. (2d) 668 (x934), in which the court, in dismissing a bill brought by a subsequent
creditor with knowledge for an injunction against the use of capital to pay an install-
ment due on a contract to purchase its own shares, said that a different question would
arise if the payment of any future installment should make the corporation insolvent.
29. Fitzpatrick v. McGregor, 133 Ga. 332, 65 S. E. 859 (igog). See also cases
cited in note 3!, infra.
30. Where a statute forbids purchase of shares except out of surplus, a contract
for the future purchase of shares has been construed as a contract to purchase shares if
the corporation had a surplus at the date of performance. Richards v. Wiener Co, 2o7
N. Y. 59. ioo N. E. 592 (1912).
31. Marvin v. Anderson, I I Wis. 387, 87 N. AV. 226 (igoi). The decision, how-
ever. rested primarily on the holding that insolvency does not mean mere temporary
inability to pay debts, but that the liabilities are in excess of the fair cash value of the
assets. It was followed, as to this definition of insolvency, in Gipson v. Bedard, x73
'Minn. 104. 217 N. NV. 139 (1927). But cf. Joseph, Trustee v. Raff, 82 App. Div. 47,
81 N. Y. Supp. 5c46 (ist Dep't 1903), aff'd "tem., 176 N. Y. 6xi, 68 N. E. six8 (1903).
For a decision sustaining the right of subsequent creditors to recover even where
the purchase merely impaired capital and the corporation did not become bankrupt until
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Several courts which treat a purchase by a corporation of its own
shares, made out of capital, as valid between the parties, have held that,
if the transaction was completed while the corporation was still solvent,
it cannot subsequently be set aside by or for creditors, even though
the corporation later becomes insolvent.3 2 A court which has already
committed itself to the proposition that a corporation may make a
binding contract to purchase its own shares out of capital may well
shrink from holding that the performance of such an agreement, which
is the legal duty of the parties as between themselves, subjects one of
them to the risk of future liability to creditors.33 It will be particu-
larly reluctant to reach such a result in a case where the only creditors
involved are subsequent creditors.3 4 The purchase, which does not
produce insolvency but merely impairment of capital, is not a fraud-
ulent conveyance even if the incurring of future debts was contem-
plated. If all prior creditors are paid, the transaction cannot be looked
upon as legally objectionable unless one takes a strong line against the
propriety of purchases that impair capital, a line which is hardly con-
sistent with the court's previously expressed views as to the power of
the corporation to employ its capital in the purchase of its shares.
Decisions refusing to require restitution under these circumstances
are a natural, even if they are not an inevitable, consequence of holding
that an agreement to purchase shares out of capital is valid between the
parties. On the other hand, a recent Massachusetts decision, 5 which
goes to even greater lengths in upholding a repurchase agreement as
against a creditor, involves an unnecessary and wholly undesirable
more than two years later, see Union Trust Co. v. Amery, 67 Wash. x, x2o Pac. 539
(1912), in which the court relied on a statute requiring a public record of capital
reduction.
Even in Wisconsin, subsequent creditors have been allowed to avoid a purchase of
shares where the shareholder knew that it was contemplated that the corporation, which
was made insolvent by the purchase, would remain in business and incur future debts.
Walworth B. & C. Ass'n v. Smith, 141 Wis. 377, 123 N. W. w66 (igio); accord,
Johnson v. Canfield Swigert Co., 292 I11. ioi, 126 N. E. 6o8 (i92o); cf. Coleman v.
Tepel, 23o Fed. 63 (C. C. A. 3d, 1916), cited note 27, supra.
32. Thompson v. Shepherd, 203 N. C. 310, 16s S. E. 796 (1932) ; Marvin v. Ander-
son, iii Wis. 387, 87 N. IV. 26 (igoi), cited note 31, supra. In the second case, the
corporation, at the time of the purchase, was solvent in the bankruptcy sense although
unable to pay its debts as they matured. Recovery of the purchase price by the cor-
poration's trustee in bankruptcy was refused. The court adverted to the fact that all
the creditors were subsequent creditors, but did not rest the case primarily on that
ground.
33. The Virginia court, which has consistently upheld purchases out of capital in
cases where no creditor was objecting, has, however, recently held that one who was a
creditor at the time when the corporation purchased its share out of capital can com-
pel a refund of the purchase price if the corporation later becomes insolvent. Marshall
v. Fredericksburg Lumber Co., 162 Va. 136, 173 S. E. 553 (1934) ; cf. Williams v.
Brownstein, i F. (2d) 470 (D. D. Me. 1924).
34. For a case in which recovery of the purchase price from one who had sold his
shares to a corporation prior to its insolvency was denied solely on the ground that sub-
sequent creditors are not entitled to relief, see Kaminsky v. Phinizy, 54 F. (2d) 16
(C. C. A. 5th, 1931).
35. Scriggins v. Thomas Dalby Co., 29 ass. 414, x95 N. E. 749 (1935).
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extension of the American rule. A creditor of a corporation, which
was admittedly unable to pay its debts as they accrued, and probably
unable to pay them at all, sought by a bill in equity to enjoin an action
at law brought by a shareholder to enforce the corporation's promise
to buy his shares. Although the corporation's promise was evidenced
by promissory notes, the plaintiff in the law action had not surrendered
his share certificates but had deposited them in escrow with a bank.
The court denied relief on the basis of findings that the corporation
was solvent when the contract was made and that, although its finan-
cial condition became rather steadily worse thereafter, it was still solv-
ent at the time when the action was brought. It is difficult to see any-
thing in those facts which should so paralyze the arm of equity as to
prevent it from aiding a creditor to obtain that to which he is entitled
by a fundamental rule of corporation law. The assets of an insolvent
corporation should be applied to the claims of its creditors in priority
to the claim of one who, despite his possession of the corporation's
notes, is still clinging to his shareholder status.3 6
Modern Statutes Relating to Purchase
A rule which leads courts to reach results such as that arrived at
in the case last cited does not belong in any enlightened system of
jurisprudence. Fortunately, statutes have now been enacted in most
of the leading corporation states which substantially restrict a corpo-
ration's power to purchase its own shares. Although a few of these
statutes notably those of New York 3 and Delaware,38 are of earlier
origin, most of them have been passed during the last fifteen years as
part of a general movement to codify and modernize the statutory law
of business corporations. The majority of these statutes, in addition
to permitting the purchase of shares out of capital in certain special
situations,3 9 give the corporation, and by inference the management,
36. The fact that the plaintiff became a creditor after the contract of purchase was
made and with knowledge of it was mentioned by the court, but not relied on as a
ground of decision. It should be irrelevant, since knowledge that the contract exists
is not assent to its enforcement under radically altered conditions.
37. NEW YORK PENAL LAW, § 664. This section makes it a misdemeanor for a
director of a stock corporation "to apply any funds of such corporation, except surplus,
directly or indirectly, to the purchase of shares of its own stock."
This section is derived from the Penal Code of i88x, § 594, which differed from
the present act only by containing the word "profits" after the word "surplus".
38. DE._ REv. CODE (935) c. 65, § ig. The section was originally enacted in its
present form by L. iog, c. i5.~
39. See, e. g., CAL. CM. CoDE (Deering, 1937) § 342, which permits purchase
from stated capital or unearned surplus for the purpose of collecting or compromising
a debt. or claim, satisfying appraisal rights of dissenting shareholders in case of merger
or consolidation, carrying out a repurchase agreement made with an employee-sub-
scriber at the time of subscribing, eliminating fractional shares, redeeming or purchas-
ing shares which are subject to redemption, carrying out conversion provisions coi'-
tained in the articles of incorporation, and distributing surplus resulting from capital
reduction. Cf. Illinois, 5 JoNEs STAT. ANN. § 32.oo6; MD. A-.,. CODE, art. 23, § 54;
OHio CODE ANN. (Throckmorton, i94o) § 8623-41.
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untrammeled discretion to buy shares out of any kind of surplus 40
(or in several important states only out of earned surplus), 41 some-
times with a proviso that the purchase shall not be made if there is rea-
sonable ground for believing that the corporation is unable or will
thereby be made unable to satisfy its debts as they fall due.42 There
are, however, a number of states in which the statute requires a share-
holders' vote for the purchase of shares,43 and a few in which such
purchases are entirely forbidden.
44
40. Some of the following statutes restrict purchases to those made out of surplus
or surplus profits; others to those which do not impair capital: ARx. DIG. STAT. (Pope,
1937) §2155 (e); CoL STAT. ANN. (Michie, 1935) c. 41, §24; DEL. REV. CODE (935)
c. 65, § ig; FLA. Coatp. GEN. LAWS ANN. (Skillman, 1927) § 6534; IND. STAr. ANN.
(Burns, 1933) § 25-202; Louisiana, L. 1928, Act 250, § 23 (vote of two-thirds of each
class required, with certain exceptions) ; MD. ANN. CoDE, art. 23, § 54 (vote of two-
thirds of each class of shares required unless the charter authorizes purchases of
shares); MICH. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, 1936) §21.10; Mo. REv. STAT. (1929)
§ 4940; NEv. Comsp. LAWS (Hillyer, x929) § i6o8, as amended by L. 1931, c. 224, § 6;
NEW YORK PENAL LAW, § 664; OHIO CODE ANN. (Throckmorton, i94o) § 8623-41
(shareholders' vote required unless the articles authorize the directors to purchase);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. (1936) tit. x8, § 58 (from surplus profits or by unanimous written
consent of shareholders); PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 15, § 2852-302 (7);
R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. (1938) c. I6, § 5 (g) ; TENN. CODE ANN. (1932) § 3722 (9) ;
W. VA. CODE ANN. (1931) C. 31, art. I, § 39.
41. CAL. CIVIL CODE (Deering, 1937) §342, and KAN. LAWS (1939) C. 152,§
permit purchase out of earned surplus only; Illinois in 5 JONES STAT. ANN. § 3.0o,
has a more complicated provision nearly equivalent to an earned surplus rule. N. D.
Comp. LAWS (1913) § 4531, and OKLA. STAT. (193i) § 9747, limit purchases to those
made out of "surplus profits" except where unanimous consent of shareholders is
obtained. The term "surplus profits" in the Oklahoma statute has, however, been given
a very broad interpretation. Western & Southern Fire Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 56 Okla.
702, 156 Pac. 885 (i9i6). GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1828 (d), in general permits purchases
out of surplus but limits them to earned surplus "where there is outstanding another
class of shares having a distribution preference over the shares purchased". MINN.
STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1938) c. 58, § 7492-21 (VI), likewise in general permits pur-
chases out of surplus, either earned or paid in, but provides that "if the corporation has
oustanding shares entitled to preferential dividends or to a preference upon liquidation,
then only such shares may be purchased or redeemed out of paid-in surplus."
In addition to the above provision limiting purchase of shares to purchases out of
earned surplus, California has the further provision that, if a surplus is created by capi-
tal reduction, such reduction surplus may, if the corporation has only one class of
shares, be used for the purchase of such shares if such purchase is authorized by the
holders of two-thirds of the shares other than those which are to be purchased. If the
corporatinn has outstanding preferred shares, reduction surplus may be used for the
purchase or redemption of such shares only. CAL. CIVIL CODE (Deerihg, 1937) § 348b.
42. Provisions of this sort exist in a number of states. See, e. g., CAL. CIVIL CODE
(Deering, 1937) § 342; OHIO GEN. CODE (Throckmorton, i94o) § 8623-41. Their
primary purpose is to furnish some protection to creditors in those situations in which
the statute authorizes the corporation to purchase out of capital; but they have the
effect, also, of prohibiting purchase in cases where the corporation has a surplus, but
its quick asset position is such that use of any substantial part of the surplus for the
purchase of shares would make the prompt payment of its debts impossible.
43. 2 CONN. GEN. STAT. (i930) § 3423, requires the affirmative vote of sharehold-
ers owning three-fourths of its outstanding stock except where the shares are acquired
to prevent loss on a debt. It does not forbid purchase out of capital. i S. D. CODE
(1939) § 11.0303, permits purchase only out of surplus and in addition requires a resolu-
tion by the shareholders or their unanimous consent in writing.
See also the Louisiana, Maryland and Ohio statutes, cited in note 40, supa.
44. Wyo. REy. STAT. (1931) §28-122, forbids purchase altogether; Ky. STAT.
(Carroll, Baldwin's 1936 Rev.) § 544, permits it only where done to prevent loss on a
debt previously contracted. In a few states, statutes which permit the acquisition of
shares in payment of debts have never been construed and might possibly be construed
as forbidding ordinary purchases. See, e. g., V=-o.NT P. L. (1933) § 58r4-
Statutory prohibition of purchase of shares except as a method of obtaining pay-
ment of a debt is common in the case of banks. See, e. g., MAss. GEN. LAws (i932)
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The assumptions behind provisions permitting the management
to make purchases out of surplus appear to be that creditors and share-
holders have the right to insist that the capital fund be preserved, but
that the use of surplus, or at any rate of earned surplus, for the pur-
pose of buying shares is not a wrong to creditors and is a wrong to
shareholders only if the transaction is entered into by the management
for some improper motive. Where there is an improper motive, the
shareholders are assumed to be adequately protected by their right to
obtain redress for any violation by the managers of their fiduciary
obligations.
These assumptions may well be challenged. Although purchases
of shares out of surplus, or at least out of earned surplus, may, under
some circumstances, be unobjectionable and even be advantageous to
the corporate enterprise, such purchases are, in general, of dubious
desirability. Investment for profit, on which our system of corporate
capitalism is based, presupposes that corporate earnings, unless needed
for investment in plant or as working capital, should normally be re-
turned to all of the shareholdeTs ratably in the form of dividends. The
existence of a managerial power to purchase has, in practice, led to a
wide variety of abuses such as purchase for stock-market manipula-
tion; 4 5 purchase in order to affect voting control; purchase in order
to buy off a "troublemaker" whose troublemaking, however annoying
to the management, may well be beneficial to the enterprise and to its
shareholders; purchase from insiders at prices which are unfair to the
corporation; and purchase from such insiders in order to enable them
to withdraw from an enterprise which has a theoretical surplus but is
actually in an unprosperous condition. Even though in most of these
instances the purchase might, under existing statutes, be attacked as
a violation of the management's fiduciary duties, the effect of such
statutes is to make the purchase prima facie valid and to impose on an
objecting shareholder the difficult burden of proving that the purchase
involved a violation of the duty of loyalty.
Moreover, if the rule limiting purchase to surplus or to earned
surplus is to mean anything substantial, it must mean that surplus
c. 172, § 39 (trust companies); PA. STAT. ANx. (Purdon, 193x) tit. 7, §§ 819-ioo9,
819-1ozx.
45. It is often contended that purchases by a corporation of its own shares for the
purpose of market stabilization as distinct from speculation or manipulation should be
regarded as legitimate. In seeking to defend purchases of shares of the Chicago Great
Western Railroad Company by one of its subsidiaries-purchases which proved to be
highly disadvantageous to the corporation-the chairman of the board has written, "We
went into the transaction on the representation that many of our best friends among the
shippers were being embarrassed by the low quotations on the stock, and that it was
necessary to offer some help in return for what they had done for the Great Western."
ADDITIONAL REPORT OF THE COM. IrEE ON INTERSTATE Co.sssERcF, UNITED STATES
SENATF, Report No. 25, Part 14 (1940).
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once used for the purchase of shares thereby ceases to be available
either for further purchases of shares or for dividends, at least until
the surplus is restored or, if one prefers, "unfrozen" by the resale
of the shares.46 If that be so, the use of surplus to buy corporate
shares invo'ves a serious inroad on what may well be regarded as the
reasonable dividend expectations of the shareholder-owners of the busi-
ness. It is, therefore, easier to prove that statutes like that of Con-
necticut,4 7 which requires the consent of shareholders, or even statutes
like that of Kentucky,48 which limits purchases of shares to the cases
in which the shares aTe taken to prevent loss on a previously contracted
debt, are unfashionable, than to prove that they are unduly.restrictive.
In any event, the power of the management to purchase out of
surplus, if granted at all, should, in the case of shares of common
stock, be limited to purchases out of earned surplus. Purchases of
common shares out of surplus paid in by preferred shareholders is
thoroughly vicious and might reasonably be held to be contrary to the
fair implication of the preferred shareholders' contract even where
the statute permits purchase out of surplus of any and all kinds. Pur-
chase of common shares out of surplus paid in by subscribers to com-
mon shares should also be forbidden. If preferred shares are to be
an appropriate investment medium, they must be safeguarded by a sub-
stantial cushion of assets made up of contributions by common share-
holders which cannot be handed back to members of the latter group
by a friendly management. Purchase of common shares out of paid-
in surplus where the corporation has no outstanding preferred shares is
less objectionable. Yet it is doubtful whether it is wise.to empower
the management to decide that a corporation which has no earnings
should return part of the common shareholders' contributions to them
either by way of dividends or of share purchases. Purchase of pre-
ferred shares out of paid-in surplus is a different matter, particularly
where, as is generally the case today, the shares are made redeemable
by the corporate charter. Because of the interrelation between re-
demption and purchase in the case of preferred shares, questions relat-
ing to purchase of such shares will be dealt with later, in that portion
of this article which deals with redeemable shares.
46. Some modem statutes contain provisions clearly intended to make surplus used
to purchase shares thereafter unavailable for dividends or additional purchases. See
CAL. CIVIL COnE (Deering, 1937) §§ 342., 342a, 342b. The last section further provides
that if the shares are resold the consideration received shall, except so far as needed to
write off a capital deficit, be added to paid-in surplus, a fund which, under § 346, is
unavailable for dividends except on preferred shares. See also Illinois, 5 Jo..Es STAT.
AxN., §§ 32.oo2 (j) (k) (m), 32.006.
47. See note 43, supra.
48. See note 44, supra.
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It may be urged that, inasmuch as most of our corporation stat-
utes permit corporations to reduce their capital by a shareholders' vote
and to distribute the reduction surplus thereby created as a dividend,
statutes prohibiting the use of capital for the purchase of shares are
largely futile as a protection to creditors. It may well be that our stat-
utory provisions with respect to capital reduction need overhauling,
but even from the angle of creditor protection there is a wide differ-
ence between permitting the management to reduce the capital of a
shaky enterprise by purchasing the shares of favored holders, and per-
mitting the management to propose a plan for capital reduction which
requires shareholder assent in order to be effective. That purchases
of shares have frequently been an important contributing cause of
ultimate insolvency is-readily demonstrable; that capital reduction has,
except in a few sporadic cases, been a contributing factor in causing
enterprises to fail would be difficult to establish.
Sanctions for Enforcing Restrictive Statutes
Most of the statutes which limit corporate authority to purchase
shares are phrased in terms of prohibition and do not contain any
explicit statement as to the sanctions by which the restrictions which
they purport to impose may be enforced. Some of the sanctions are
obvious enough. A statute which provides that a corporation shall
purchase shares only out of surplus (or, what would seem to amount
to the same thing, that it shall not purchase them if its capital is im-
paired or would be impaired by the transaction) indubitably has the
effect of making its promise to purchase unenforceable if it has not
sufficient surplus with which to pay the price.41  Moreover, since it
is the use of capital for this purpose which is objectionable, the legally
significant date is the date when performance of the contract is sought,
rather than the date on which it is made.Gu
49. Pasotti v. United States Guardian Corp., 18 Del. Ch. 1, i56 Atl. 255 (1931),
holding such an agreement unenforceable even against a corporation which was in
liquidation and had paid all its debts. Richards v. Weiner Co., 2o7 N. Y. 59, loo N. F.
592 (1912), holding that the burden is on the corporation to show its present lack of
surplus and consequent legal liability to perform. But cf. Cross v. Beguelin, 252 N. Y.
262, 169 N. E. 378 (1929), where, on a peculiar state of facts, the agreement was held
to be enforceable in competition with the claims of certain subsequent creditors.
It would presumably be held that the performance of a contract to purchase could
be enjoined by a shareholder who could show that the corporation had no surplus. Cf.
Stott v. Orloff, 261 Mich. 302, 246 N. V. 128 (x933).
50. There seems to be no judicial dissent from this proposition, if we exclude the
cases discussed below in which the real question is whether a contract of purchase is
performed by the giving of a corporate note or only by the payment of the note. See
In re Tichenor-Grand Co., 2o3 Fed. 720 (S. D. N. Y. 1913) ; also cases cited in note49, .Supra.
The same view is taken in cases arising under the common-law rule permitting
purchases out of capital by solvent corporations, solvency at the date of the contract
being insufficient if the corporation is insolvent at the date of performance. Keith v.
Kilmer, 261 Fed. 733 (C. C. A. ist, 192o), cert. denied, 252 U. S. 578 (z920), same
case, 272 Fed. 643 (C. C. A. 1st, 1921), cert. denied, 257 U. S. 639 (1921) (involving
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The answer to a closely related question is more doubtful. Sup-
pose that, at a time when the corporation has a surplus and could
legally buy some of its shares with cash, it enters into an arrange-
ment with a shareholder whereby he surrenders his share certificate
and purports to give up all of his rights as a shareholder in return for
a promissory note of the c6rporation. If the corporation becomes
insolvent or loses its surplus before the note falls due, has it a valid
defense against liability on the note, if the latter is still in the hands
of the former shareholder? In In re Fecheiner Fish-el Co.51 the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit answered this question
in the affirmative, and there are several later decisions in accord with
this view.
52
These decisions treat the subsequent payment of a note which
was given in exchange for contemporaneously surrendered shares as
an unlawful application of corporate funds to the purchase of shares.
If a shareholder in a highly prosperous company should exchange his
shares for a note or bond and thus lose his claim to substantial divi-
dends which were subsequently declared, it would be decidedly harsh
to deny him recovery on his note or bond merely because, after a lapse
of several years, the corporation's financial condition had changed for
the worse. One may, however, hazard the prediction that such a case
will be of rare occurrence. Shareholders in genuinely successful cor-
porations do not often exchange their status for that of creditors. 53
a Maine corporation; holding that the question of the claimant's right to recover if
assets remained after all creditors had been paid was not properly before the court) ;
Boggs v. Fleming, 66 F. (2d) 859 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933) (involving a Virginia corpora-
tion). But cf. Scriggins v. Thomas Dalby Co., cited note 35, supra, holding insolvency
occurring subsequent to the bringing of suit against the corporation to be immaterial.
51. 212 Fed. 357 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914), cert. dcnied, 234 U. S. 76o (1914). The.
case involved a corporation which was governed by NEw YORE PNAL LAW, § 664,
cited note 37, supra.
52. Robinson v. Wangemann, 75 F. (2d) 756 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935); In re O'Gara
& Maguire, 259 Fed. 935 (D. N. J. is99). In both cases, proof of claim- on a note
given by a corporation for its shares was denied where the corporation had become
insolvent subsequent to the giving of the note. Neither case involved any statute lim-
iting the power to purchase. See also In re Vulcan Soot Cleaner Co., ii F. Supp. 388
(W. D. Pa. 1935), involving a Delaware corporation. The shares were returned to the.
seller as collateral security for the corporation's note, but this fact is not made the
basis of the decision.
But cf. Volff v. Heidritter Lumber Co., 112 N. J. Eq. 34, 164 Atl. 140 (Ch..1932).
53. It is probable, however, that in the case of some small corporations whose
shares have no ready market, the exchange of shares for notes is due less to doubts
about the solvency of the enterprise than to a desire on the part of a shareholder for
a more liquid asset or to a desire on the part of the management to get rid of a tr6uble-
maker as a shareholder and to do so without the immediate drain on the corporation's
current funds which would be brought about by a cash payment Cf. Boggs v. Flem-
ing, 66 F. (2d) 859 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1933), cited note 5o, rupra, in which the primary
purpose of the transaction seems to have been to eliminate the plaintiff, who was presi-
dent as well as a substantial shareholder, from the enterprise as rapidly as possible.
The agreement provided for immediate release of the corporation from his employment
contract, exchange of his common shares for preferred shares, and the gradual reduc-
tion of the latter through the payment of $25,000 in ten annual installments. See also
Loveland v. Doernbecher Mfg. Co., 149 Ore. 58, 39 P. (2d) 668 (1934), cited note 28,
supra.
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On the other hand, insiders who know that, although the corporation
has a theoretical surplus, it is actually in an unprosperous condition,
would be offered a tempting opportunity to "rat" while the ratting
is good if the courts were to hold that, despite the subsequent insolv-
ency of the corporation, corporate notes issued in exchange for shares
are enforceable, in the absence of proof that a book surplus existing
at the time of the exchange was legally nonexistent.
A quite different question is presented by cases in which the pur-
chase is completed by the payment of cash at a time when the corpo-
ration, although solvent, has no surplus. If the shareholder knew of
the lack of surplus, he has knowingly participated in an unlawful act
and he should be under a duty to refund the purchase price, at suit of
the corporation or of its receiver or trustee in bankruptcy.,4 But what
of the innocent shareholder-participant in such a transaction? Should
the latter's ignorance of the corporation's financial condition, or hi
honest and perhaps reasonable belief in the existence of an adequate
surplus, be a defense to an action subsequently brought by the cor-
poration, or by a representative of its creditors to compel him to refund
the amount which he has received? Few statutes touch the point even
by implication.
55
Decisions holding that an innocent recipient of unlawful divi-
dends need not refund them if the corporation was solvent when the
dividend was paid are clearly distinguishable. The shareholder is a mere
passive recipient of dividends; " he is an active participant in a sale
of his shares. Receipt of dividends is an ordinary transaction, occur-
ring at frequent intervals. Purchase, even though generally valid if
a surplus does exist, is an unusual transaction, a single instance un-
likely to recur so far as the individual shareholder is concerned. The
legal power of successful corporations to declare dividends is essential
to the proper functioning of modern capitalism and one who re-
54. The purchase out of capital in violation of statute is a misuse of corporate
funds and a wrong to the other shareholders and not merely to the creditors.
But cf. CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1937) § 365, which limits liability to one "who
sells such shares knowing that the corporation is the purchaser with knowledge of facts
indicating the impropriety of such purchase", and imposes it only if the corporation is
adjudged insolvent or bankrupt in any proceeding brought within a year.
15. Cf. MD. A.N. CODE (Flack, 1939) art. 23, § 54 (3) (7), which limits purchases
to those out of surplus and provides that, if the purchase is in violation of the Act, the
recipient of payment shall be liable to refund it so far as needed to pay corporate debts
existing at the time of payment.
But Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1937) § 365, cited note 54, supra. See also QHio
CODE Ax. (Throckmorton, 1940) § 8623-123b, imposing liability to the corporation
on those who knowingly accept or receive any unauthorized "dividend or distribution".
MIci. STAT. AN.N. (Henderson, 1936) tit. i,, §2148, and Mi.N. STAT. (Mason,
Supp. 1938) § 7492-22, impose liability to the corporation on all shareholders who
receive any unauthorized dividends or distributions.
56. In Wood v. National City Bank, 24 F. (2d) 661, 662 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), Judge
Learned Hand said that the payment of dividends out of capital "is primarily only the
wrong of those who commit it [the directors], like any other tort, and innocent partici-
pants [the recipient shareholders] are not accomplices in its commission."
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ceives a dividend from a supposedly successful corporation assumes
that he is merely reaping the normal reward which our economic sys-
tem holds out and must hold out as an inducement to those who supply
business with its essential funds. The seller of shares to a supposedly
prosperous corporation, on the other hand, is taking part in a trans-
action which would, even if the supposed surplus existed, be one which
the law may be regarded as tolerating rather than encouraging.
In fairness not only to creditors but also to other shareholders,
who are likely to be adversely affected by purchases which impair
capital, the selling shareholder should not be permitted to receive cor-
porate assets in payment, except subject to a duty to disgorge if it
later turns out that the sale was unlawful1 7  On the other hand, one
who reasonably believes that the purchaser of his shares is someone
other than the corporation should not be compelled to refund money,
which unknown to him came from the corporation, even though the
payment impaired its capital.A8
What of the liability of directors who authorize the purchase?
Statutory provisions that explicitly relate to such liability are exceed-
ingly uncommon, 59 but statutes that impose liability on directors for
declara.ion of improper dividends are frequently so phrased as to
include other unlawful distributions of capital.6 0 Such statutes gen-
erally imit liability to negligent or willful misconduct,"' a limitation
which is equitable in view of the fact that directors do not as such
obtain any of the fruits of such distributions. The questions of what
57. Cf. Uffelman v. Boillin, ig Tenn. App. 1, 40, 82 S. V. (2d) 545, 568 (1935),
holding shareholders liable to refund where the law did not permit purchase unless
proper steps had been taken for capital reduction, but approving the Chancellor's decree
which limited recovery by a receiver of a solvent corporation to rocovery for the ben-
efit of those shareholders who had not approved of or acquiesced in the transaction.
58. Recovery has been denied under such circumstances in several cases involving
illegal purchases of their own shares by banks or trust companies. Johnston v. Laflin,
io3 U. S. 8oo (z88o): Corn v. Skillen, 75 Ark. 148. 87 S. W. 142 (19o). Contra:
Crandall, Receiver v. Lincoln, 52 Conn. 73 (1884), cited note 21, supra.
59. For such a statute, see CAL CiV. CODE (Deering, 1937) § 363.
6o. For such statutes, see Illinois, 5 JoNEs STAT. AN-N. § 32.042; NEw YORK
STOCY CORPOATIox LAW, § r8, as amended by L. 1939, c. 364: Oiio CODE ANN.
(Throckmorton, I94o) § 8623-123b: PA. STAT. Ax,,. (Purdon, 1938) tit. I;. § 2852-707.
For cases holding directors liable for improper purchases of shares, see Jesson v.
Noys, 245 Fed. 46 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917), permitting recovery by a receiver against di-
rectors of a Nevada corporation who caused it to buy its shares out of capital in viola-
tion of a statute of that state; Re Burnett-Clark, Ltd., 56 F. (2d) 744 (C. C. A. 2d,
1932), permitting recovery by a trustee in bankruptcy of a Maryland corporation doing
business in New York against its directors for purchasing shares out of capital, the
liability being based on §§ 58 and i4 of the Stock Corporation Law, §§ 6o and 6r of the
General Corporation Law, and §§ 664 and 667 of the Penal Code of New York; New
York Credit Men's Ass'n v. Harris, I7O Misc. 988. 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 435 (939), allow-
ing recovery against directors of a New York corporation by an assignee for creditors
suing on behalf of subsequent creditors. The suit was said to be maintainable under
§ 58 of the Stock Corporation Law and also under § 6o of the General Corporation Law.
6I. But see PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1938) tit. x5. § 2852-707. Cf. Uffelman v.
Boillin, i9 Tenn. r, 38, 82 S. W. (2d) 545 (1935), in which directors who, acting on
legal advice, erroneously believed that they had the right to cause their corporation to
purchase its own shares, were held not liable for making such purchase.
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the standard of care should be, and of who should bear the burden of
proof 82 will arouse more difference of opinion. This is particularly
true in cases where directors who have failed to provide their cor-
poration with an adequate accounting system seek to rebut a claim of
negligent conduct by showing honest reliance on erroneously kept
books or balance sheets.68
Repurchase Agreements Made as Terms of Original Subscriptions
Many of the cases on purchase of shares involve purchases made
pursuant to a stipulation in the original subscription obligating the
corporation to repurchase the shares under certain circumstances. The
most common type of such repurchase agreements is a promise made
to a prospective subscriber that if the latter will subscribe and pay
for shares, the corporation will subsequently repurchase them at
the original price should the subscriber become dissatisfied with his
bargain. Such a provision is calculated to deprive the corporation
of capital at the time when it needs it most, and thus to jeopardize the
claims of its creditors. "Your money back if you are not satisfied
with our product" is a promise wholly unsuited to a transaction in
which "our product" is a certificate representing ownership rights in
a corporation and purporting to involve a permanent contribution to
its capital.
If, however, the state does not effectively prevent corporations
from baiting the hook for the investor in this manner, it is easy to lend
a sympathetic ear to the investor's contention that the promise to re-
purchase, which induced him to part with his money, should be en-
forced, even in the teeth of a statute forbidding purchases of shares
out of funds other than corporate surplus. Repurchase agreements
are part of the stock in trade of those security salesmen who distribute
shares in speculative enterprises to financially illiterate and, generally
speaking, relatively impecunious buyers. 4  S,.ch persons are likely to
62. For statutory provisions as to the extent to which reliance on corporate books
or balance sheets or statements prepared by appropriate officers or accountants are a
defense to liability for improper distributions, see CAL CIv. CODE (Deering, 1937)
§ 363; Illinois, 5 JoNiEs SlAT. Anx. § 32.042; OHIO CODE ANx.. (Throckmorton, ig4o)
§ 8623-i23b.
63. The New York statute, Srocn COMRATo0N LAW, § 58, as amended by L.
1939, c. 364, places the burden on the directors "affirmatively [to] show that they had
reasonable grounds to believe, and did believe, that such dividend or distribution would
not impair the capital of the corporation, . . .
64. The cases indicate that such repurchase agreements were widely used as induce-
ments in the "customer-ownership" stock-selling campaigns which were engaged
in by a number of public utility companies and public utility holding companies during
the boom period of the nineteen-twenties. Some of this stock was of a highly specu-
lative character.
Two cases, Thomas v. People's Gas & Elec. Co., 220 Iowa 85o, 263 N. V. 499
(193), and Beckroge v. South Carolina Public Service Co., x85 S. C. 210, 193 S. E.
315 0937), involve agreements by a public utility company to repurchase shares of its
parent corporation. Although the purchase by a corporation of shares of its corporate
parent is in some respects even more objectionable than purchase of a corporation's
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be financially less able to suffer the hardship of losing their money
than is the average corporate creditor. It is, therefore, not surprising
that in most of the earlier cases the courts permitted the shareholder
to get his money back without inquiry as to the existence of any cor-
porate surplus,6 5 nor is it surprising that a number of courts reached
this result in spite of statutes which had previously been construed as
forbidding purchases of shares, or purchases which involved a with-
drawal of capital.06 Various legal formulae have been made use of in
an effort to rationalize this result. 67 All of them, however, slur over
the patent fact that, if such agreements are enforceable despite the non-
existence of surplus, shareholder-owners are thus, by 'Virtue of an
invisible and unsuspected string attached to their shares, allowed to
impair the margin of safety provided for creditors.
Even those courts ,which adopt a sympathetic attitude towards
investors who have purchased in reliance on such agreements generally
refuse to enforce them if the corporation is insolvent at the time when
the shareholder seeks to obtain repayment.68 Nearly all of the recent
own shares, very few statutes place any restrictions on the former type of purchase.
But see CAL. Crv. CODE (Deering, 1937) § 342. See also ADDITIONAL REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE, UNITED STATES SENATE, note 45, supra, which
deals with a purchase of Chicago Great Western shares by one of its subsidiaries.
In the Beckroge case, a charter provision empowering the corporation to purchase
shares in other companies was held to authorize the making of an agreement by a sub-
sidiary, which was selling its parent's shares as agent of the latter, that it would repur-
chase the shares.
65. See, e. g., Vent v. Duluth Coffee & Spice Co., 64 Minn. 307, 67 N. W. 7o
(1896); United States Mineral Co. v. Camden & Driscoll, 106 Va. 663, 56 S. E. 561
(1907); Adam v. New England Investment Co., 33 R. I. 193, 8o AtI. 426 (i9ii);
Wolf v. Excelsior A. S. & S. Co., Inc., 27o Pa. 547, 113 Atl. 569 (i92i).
For recent statutory changes in Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Minnesota, see
notes 40 and 41, mipra.
66. Ophir Consol. Mines Co. v. Brynteson, 143 Fed. 8_-9 (C. C. A. 7th, i9o6)
(Colorado statute prohibiting purchase) ; Mulford v. Torrey Exploration Co, 45 Colo.
81, ioo Pac. 596 (igog) (same Colorado statute) ; Schulte v. Boulevard Gardens Land
Co, 164 Cal. 464, 129 Pac. 582 (1913) (statute prohibiting division of any part of the
capital stock or reduction of stock except as provided by law); Sweeny v. United
Underwriters Co., 29 S. D. 576, 137 N. W. 379 (1912) (substantially similar statute).
For the present statutory law of California, see notes 39 and 41, stspra; for that
of Colorado, see note 40, supra.
For early decisions unfavorable to such agreements, see Wilson v. Lorchon Lace
& Mercantile Co., 167 Mo. App. 305, 149 S. W. 1156 (1912); In re Tichenor-Grand
Co., 203 Fed. 720 (S. D. N. Y. 1913), cited note 5o, .supra.
67. Such as (a) that the contract is one of "sale or return" (although it is hard
to see how this concept is of assistance in determining whether the "or return" pro-
vision is valid), Ophir Consol. Mines Co. v. Brynteson, 143 Fed. 829 (C. C. A. 7th,
x9o6), cited note 66, supra: (b) that the contract, even if ultra vires, is enforceable
against the corporation because the latter, having received benefits under it, is estopped
to set up its invalidity, Colorado Industrial L. & I. Co. v. Clem, 82 Colo. 399, 26o Pac.
io9 (1927) ; and (c) that if the repurchase agreement is invalid, the shareholder is
entitled to recover on a theory of rescission, Vent v. Duluth Coffee & Spice Co., 64
Minn. 307, 67 N. W. 70 (1896), cited note 65, supra; Sweeny v. United Underwriters
Co., 29 S. D. 576, 137 N. W. 379 (1912), cited note 66, supra; Griffin v. Bankers Realty
Investment Co., io5 Neb. 419, 18i N. W. i69 (i92o).
68. White v. Lorimer's City Dye Works, 46 Idaho 490, 269 Pac. 9o (1928) ; Mc-
Intyre v. E. Bement's Sons, 146 Mich. 74, x09 N. W. 45 (i96); Davies v. Mon-
tana Auto Finance Corp., 86 Mont. 500, 284 Pac. 267 (i93o); Grinde v. Dakota Trust
& Savings Bank, 54 S. D. 175, 222 N. W. 670 (1929) (involving shares of a subsidiary
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cases arising_under statutes which explicitly limit purchases to sur-
plus 69 or forbid purchases out of capital '0 have gone further and
held that these repurchase agreements constitute no exception to the
statutory rule. Whether this modern trend is due to increasing judicial
awareness of the evil effects, on shareholders and creditors alike, of
permitting capital to be dissipated in this manner, or is due to the
greater explicitness of most of the more recent statutory provisions
imposing restrictions on purchases of shares, is not entirely clear. At
all events, in jurisdictions where there are no statutory provisions on
the subject, the judicial tendency is still in the direction of permitting
one who has purchased shares on the faith of a repurchase agreement
to recover his money, provided the corporation remains solvent. This
.is so'even where the facts indicate or strongly suggest that the cor-
poration had no surplus.7 1  However, in many of the cases tere is no
suggestion in the opinion that the defendant corporation, which was
resisting enforcement of a repurchase agreement on other grounds,
2
corporation). In the Idaho and Michigan cases the court said that it was unnecessary
to decide whether the contract was valid apart from the insolvency.
69. In re Tichenor-Grand Co., 203 Fed. 72o (S. D. N. Y. i913), cited note So,
supra; Richards v. Weiner, 2o7 N. Y. 59, ioo N. E. 592 (1912), cited note 49, supra
(stating that a repurchase agreement should be construed as an agreement to buy only
out of surplus, as otherwise it would be invalid) ; Topken, Loring & Schwartz, Inc. v.
Schwartz, 249 N. Y. 2o6, 163 N. E. 735 (1928) (declining to enforce a repurchase
agreement against the shareholder on the ground that the corporation's promise to re-
purchase, being enforceable only if it had a surplus, was illusory). All these cases in-
volve repurchase agreements made with employee-subscribers.
7o. Pasotti v. United States Guardian Corp., 18 Del. Ch. x, 156 At. 255 (1931),
cited note 49, supra (refusing to enforce a repurchase agreement against a corporation
which was in receivership but had paid all its debts) ; Bishop v. Middle States Utilities
Co., 225 Iowa 941, 282 N. W. 305 (939) (holding the answer of a Delaware corpora-
tion that it had no surplus with which to carry out its repurchase agreement good on
demurrer) ; Cleveland v. Jencks Mfg. Co., 54 R. I. 218, 171 At. 917 (1934) (involving
an agreement between a corporation which later became insolvent and its employee that
the corporation would procure a guaranty from a third party to purchase the employee's
share at a certain price). But cf. Colorado Industrial L. & I. Co. v. Clem, 82 Colo.
399, 26o Pac. ioi9 (1927), cited note 67, supra, in which the court said that, even though
the corporation had no surplus, the purchase would not impair the capital if the pur-
chased shares were retained in the treasury available for resale.
For cases holding that other types of restrictive statutory provisions invalidated
a repurchase agreement, see Pothier v. Reid Air Spring Co., w03 Conn. 38o, i3o Atl.
383 (1925) ; Merchants' Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Bond-Foley Lumber Co., 222 Ky.
320, 300 S. W. 872 (1927) ; Norwalk v. Marcus, 235 App. Div. 211, 256 N. Y. Supp.
697 O(st Dep't 1932), affd mer., 26x N. Y. 615, 185 N. E. 761 (i933). In Hansen v.
California Bank, 17 Cal. App. (2d) 8o, 6i P. (2d) 794 (1936), the statute, which has
since been repealed, specifically forbade repurchase agreements, except in the case of
subscriptions by employees.
71. Oklahoma Natural Gas Corp. v. Douglas, 170 Okla. 284, 39 P. (2d) 578
(1934) ; Mississippi Power Co. v. Bennett, i73 Miss. xO9, 161 So. 301 (1935) ; Grace
Securities Corp. v. Roberts, 158 Va. 792, 164 S. E. 700 (1932) ; Learmouth v.- Cale-
donia County Co-op. Creamery Ass'n, Inc., io9 Vt. 52 6. i A. (2d) 732 (1938). In the
Oklahoma case, the plaintiff's recovery was based on the theory that the repurchase
agreement was made fraudulently, without intent to perform it. But cf. Harriman
Nat. Bank v. Perry. 86 F. (2d) 64! (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
For additional cases on the general subject of repurchase agreements made con-
temporaneously with the original subscription, see Note (1936) ilo A. L. R. 154.
72. Such as lack of authority in the selling agent to make the repurchase agree-
ment, the statute of frauds, and the parol evidence rule. Attempts to resist recovery on
these grounds have rarely been successful.
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had made the point that its capital was impaired. A company which
was still a going concern might well be reluctant to advertise its
financial difficulties by making such a defense, particularly in a juris-.
diction in which the legal validity of the defense was doubtful. Two
courts have, however, recently recognized the unfairness to other
shareholders of repurchase agreements by refusing to enforce them on
the ground that they violate the principle of equality of treatment as
between shareholders of the same class.
78
In addition to being used as a stock selling device, repurchase
agreements are also frequently entered into as part of an arrangement
by which an employee of a corporation subscribes to some of its shares
with an agreement that, on termination of his employment, he will
resell his shares to the company. The agreement may obligate the
corporation to buy, as well as the employee to sell. In some cases it
is in the form of an option to the employee to sell on terminating his
employment, without his being obligated to do So.74
Some labor union leaders and labor sympathizers regard pro-
posals for the purchase of shares of a corporate employer by non-
management employees with suspicion as Munich-like appeasement
offers aimed at breaking down labor's will to fight for higher pay and
shorter hours and at reducing its will to prepare for such fighting by
organizing itself. One cannot, however, reasonably expect. that the
business organizations law of a capitalistic society wili be based on
the premise that anything which tends to dull the fighting edge of
labor in a class war with capital is contrary to public policy. In the
present state of society, judges and legislators are likely not only to
tolerate, but affirmatively to approve plans for giving labor a financial
interest in industry through share ownership.75 Moreover, most of
the litigated cases have involved sales of shares to executives rather
than to the type of employee who would be regarded as a good prospect
for labor union membership.
Repurchase agreements are a common, perhaps almost a necessary
concomitant of employee-purchase plans, particularly in the case of
the smaller corporations. The primary purpose of such plans is to
73. Hoopes v. Leddy, 1t9 N. J. Eq. 296, 182 At. 27! (Ch. 1936); West Texas
Utilities Co. v. Ellis, 126 S. W. (2d) 13 (Tex. Comm. App. 1939). In the latter case.
the statute was construed to require such equality. Both cases relate to preferred
shares.
74. Various legal questions which arise in connection with such plans are discussed
in Fordham, Some Legal Aspects of Employce Stock Purchase Plans (193o) 8 N. C.
L. REV. 161.
75. This share ownership was estimated in 1928 to amount to over $i,ooO.OOo,ooo
in value, or about one per cent. of the then value of all American corporate stock.
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, Ixc., E-mPLOYEE STOCY PURCHASE PLANS
IX THE UNITED STATES (1928).
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give the employees a stake in the enterprise in which they are em-
ployed. 76 Generally speaking, neither party desires that the stake
continue if the employment relationship ceases to exist. One who has
formerly worked for, but is now no longer connected with a corpora-
tion and who originally invested in its shares because of his employ-
ment may well feel that the continuation of this investment under the
changed conditions is undesirable, particularly if the shares have no
ready market.7 7 The corporation, on its side, is likely for several
reasons to desire the power to repurchase the shares on termination of
the employment. It may be reluctant to have them remain in the
hands of one who may now be in the employ of a competitor. It may
wish to acquire them so that it can sell shares to the employee's suc-
cessor without the necessity of increasing its capital. If the shares
have been offered to the employee at less than their value, it will seek
to prevent his profiting from this low offer by quitting his job as soon
as he has acquired the shares.
In view of the special circumstances under which the investment
is made; the application of a rule of law limiting repurchase to cases
in which the corporation has a sufficient surplus for that purpose will
have unfortunate consequences for both parties, particularly for the
employee-investor. The corporation's failure to earn a surplus may
result in curtailment of its working force and in loss of the employee's
job. If, in addition, his savings are frozen in non-dividend-paying
and unmarketable shares which the corporation cannot legally buy
from him despite its promise to do so, his plight is a serious one. The
harshness of this result is accentuated if, as is sometimes the case, his
original investment was made under a considerable amount of com-
pulsion.
If we really want to promote, and not merely to tolerate, a type
of share subscription which is advocated by its proponents largely for
the very reason that it serves other purposes than that of contributing
to corporate capital, it may well be that we should relieve this special
type of shareholder from the full rigor of the rule which refuses to
permit shareholders to withdraw any part of the corporate capital.
Nevertheless, if such an exception is to be made, it should, at least in
jurisdictions where the statute spec.ifically forbids purchases that im-
pair capital, be made by a special statutory provision rather than by a
1 76. Sale of securities to employees may be motivated to some extent also by the
desire to tap an additional source of new capital and to do so without incurring any
stock-selling expense.
77. Moreover, most such plans provide for payment for the shares by installments.
An employee who loses his job, perhaps without obtaining another, is not likely to be
in a position to continue to make installment payments, and naturally desires to have
the payments already made refunded.
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judge-made exception to the general rule. Such special statutory pro-
visions exist in a few states.78
Judicial decisions on the subject have not in fact distinguished
this type of repurchase agreement from those made with non-employee
investors. In cases which involve repurchase agreements with em-
ployees, as in other cases, the agreement has, in the absence of re-
strictive statutes, generally been treated as enforceable without regard
to the existence of surplus.79 Statutes stipulating that the directors
shall not permit the withdrawal of capital have been variously con-
strued, 0 and the corporation laws of New York and Delaware, which
specifically limit purchases, in the first state to those made out of sur-
plus,"' and in the second to those which do not impair capital,82 have
been held applicable to repurchase agreements with employees.
Federal Statutes and Regulations
Recent federal statutes and the regulations of the Securities and
Exchange Commission adopted pursuant thereto affect the purchase
of shares in two ways: (a) by regulating stock market operations by
all types of companies, and (b) by regulating all forms of purchase
of their own shares by particular classes of companies.
Stock market operations by a corporation with a view to pegging
the market are now regulated by Section 9 (a) (6) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, which makes it unlawful for any p.rsoft
"To effect either alone or with one or more other persons
any series of transactions for the purchase and/or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange for the pur-
pose of pegging, fixing, or stabilizing the price of such security
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors."
78. See CAL. CODE Crv. Pitoc. (Deering, 1937) § 342; Omo CODE Axte. (Throck-
morton, i94o) § 8723-41.
79. Strodl v. Farish-Stafford Co., 145 App. Div. 406, 130 N. Y. Supp. 35 (ist Dep't
igiI), involving North Carolina and Connecticut corporations; Koch v. Val Verde
Mercantile Corp., 4 S. W. (2d) 662 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
8o. In Williams v. Maryland Glass Corp., 134 Md. 320, zo6 Atl. 755 (igig), such
a repurchase agreement was held enforceable by the corporation despite the existence
of such a statute. A contrary view was taken in Kom v. Cody Detective Agency, 176
Wash. 54o, 136 Pac. 1155 (1913), in which the contract was held unenforceable against
a solvent corporation. The present Maryland statute limits purchases to surplus with
certain exceptions not here material. MD. CODE ANN. (Bagby, 1937) art. 23, § 54.
81, For the effect of the New York statute on repurchase agreements with em-
ployees, see Richards v. Weiner, 207 N. Y. 59, 1oo N. E. 592 (1912); In re Tihenor-
Grand Co., 2o3 Fed. 720 (S. D. N. Y. 1x93); Topken, Loring & Schwartz, Inc. v.
Schwartz. 249 N. Y. 206, 163 N. E. 735 0928).
82. Hegarty v. American Com. Power Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 231, 174 At. 273 (x934).
The corporation was insolvent, but the court stated broadly that the statutory prohibi-
tion of purchases which impair capital is applicable to repurchase agreements with
employees. Cf. Cleveland v. Jencks Mfg. Co., 54 R. I. 218, 171 Atl. 917 (1934).
.717
718 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
In addition, a ruling of the Federal Trade Commission; the prede-
cessor of the Securities and Exchange Commission as enforcement
agency for the Securities Act of 1933,83 that a corporation which
desires to resell to the public shares which it has acquired must register
them under that act, has had a strong tendency to discourage repur-
chases made with a view to what Lord Herschell called "trafficking in
the shares". 8 '
National banks have long been forbidden to loan money on the
security of their own shares or to purchase their own shares except
where the transaction is necessary to prevent loss on'a debt previously
contracted in good faith.85
Since 1935 it has been unlawful for any corporation which is
subject to the Public Utility Holding Company Act of that year
"to declare or pay any dividend on any security of such company
or to acquire, retire, or redeem any security of such company, in
contravention of such rules and regulations or orders as the Com-
mission deems inecessary or appropriate to protect the financial
integrity of companies in holding-company systems, to safeguard
the working capital of public-utility companies, to prevent the
payment of dividends out of capital or unearned surplus, or to
prevent the circumvention of the provisions of this title or the
rules, regulations, or orders thereunder." 86
Pursuant to this provision, the Commission has promulgated Rule
U-12C-I which, with certain exceptions, forbids registered holding
companies and their subsidiaries to acquire, retire, or redeem any
securities issued by them except in accordance with the declaration
which has become effective as specified in Rule U-8. The latter rule
provides that the Commission may require a public hearing if it deems
such hearing to be appropriate, in the public interest, or in the interests
of investors or consumers.
Investment companies have long been peculiarly, prone to indulge
in the practice of purchasing their own shares. Many of them are
organized on the "open-end" plan, which makes their shares in effect
redeemable at the option of the holder, and thus places them in the.
category of redeemable shares which are dealt with in the second sec-
tion of this article. An investment company which is not so organized
is commonly referred to as a "closed-end" company and is so desig-
nated in the Investment Company Act of 194o. The act forbids any
such company to
83. F. T. C. Release No. 131, March 13, 1934.
84. See Trevor v. Whitworth, 12 App. Cas. 409, 417 (H. L. 1887).
85. REv. STAT. § 5201 (1927), 12 U. S. C. A. § 83 (1936), originally Act of June
3, 864, c. 1o6, § 35, 13 STAT. 110.
86. 49 STAT. 823, x5 U. S. C A. § 791 (c) (Supp. 194o).
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"purchase any securities of any class of which it is the issuer
except
(I) on a securities exchange or such other'open market
as the Commission may designate by rules and regulations or
orders: Provided, that if such securities are stock, such regis-
tered company shall, within the preceding six months, have
informed stockholders of its intention to purchase stock of
such class by letter or report addressed to stockholders of
such class; or.
(2) pursuant to tenders, after reasonable opportunity
to submit tenders given to all holders of securities of the
class to be purchased; or
(3) under such other circumstances as the Commission
may permit by rules and regulations or orders for the pro-
tdction of investors in order to insure that such purchases
are made in a mainer or on a basis which does not unfairly
discriminate against any holders of the class or classes of
securities to be purchased." 87
These provisions are obviously designed to prevent discrimina-
tion between shareholders in the purchase of shares. The Act does
not place any limitations on the funds which may be used for the pur-
chase of shares except where the investment company is issuing addi-
tional senior securities. If the new issue is to be an issue of debentures,
the corporation must provide that no shares shall be purchased unless
the value of the corporate assets, after deducting the purchase price of
the shares, is equal to 300 per cent of the amount of the debentures.
If the new issue is to be an issue of preferred shares, the corporation
must provide that no shares of common stock shall be purchased unless
the value of the corporate assets, after deductir.g the purchase price of
the shares, is equal to 2oo per cent of the amount of the preferred
shares28
II. REDEMPTION OF SHARES
The term "redeemable shares" as used in this article will be con-
fined to shares which are made redeemable by provisions in the articles
of incorporation. 9 Redemption of such shares may be compulsory
either at a fixed date or upon the happening of some contingency, or
the redemption may be at the option either of the corporation or of
87. 76th Cong., 3d'Sess., c. 686 (Aug. 22, xg4o) §23, i5 U. S. C. A. § 8oa-23(c)
(Supp. 1940).
88. 76th Cong., 3d Sess., c. 686 (Aug. 22, 194o) § 18, r5 U. S. C. A. § 8oa-s8 (Supp.
1940).
89. The effe t of redemption provisions contained in by-laws or in share certificates
will not be dealt with. Many modern statutes, if literally construed, require that such
provisions be inserted in the articles of incorporation. Cf. Gaskell v. Gladys Belle Co.,
z6 Del. Ch. 289, 146 Atl. 337 (1929).
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the holder. Redemption provisions are, in general, unusual in the case
of common shares. On the other hand, provisions for redemption,
generally at the option of the corporation, have become almost universal
in the case of preferred shares.90 There are, however, two types of
redeemable common shares which occur with sufficient frequency to
deserve particular mention.
Redeemable Common Shares of "Open-end" hivestinent Companies
The articles of incorporation of many modern investment com-
panies contain provisions to the effect that the company will repur-
chase such shares at any time, usually at a price slightly below their
asset value.91 These companies, which are commonly known as "open-
end" companies, have generally issued only one class of shares.92  The
typical purchaser of shares in such companies is a person who desires
to take advantage of the skill of their managers as investment experts
and the dilution of risk which the diversified portfolio of such com-
panies affords him, and who wishes at the same time to obtain a degree
of liquidity equal to that which he would secure if he invested directly
in the underlying securities. Unless the investment company is so large
that its own shares have a broad market, its shareholders can obtain
the liquidity which they desire only if the company itself agrees to
purchase their shares at any time. For this and other reasons, there
is a strong investor demand for the "open-end" plan of organization
of such companies. If, as is generally the case, the discount from
asset value which "open-end" companies agree to pay on redemption
is insubstantial, the redemption price is fair both to the shareholders
who withdraw and to those who remain in the enterprise. Although,
as the Securities and Exchange Commission has pointed out,9 3 there
is the theoretical possibility that an investment company organized
according to this plan may suffer the equivalent of a run on a bank,
there would seem in practice to be little danger of serious consequences
to the enterprise if its assets are invested in readily marketable se-
curities; and the existence of such a redemption provision will have
9o. For general discussions of legal problems relating to redeemable shares, see
Jones, Redecemable Corporate Securities (ig3i) 5 So. CALIF. L. RELV. 83; Note (x935)
83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 888. For a collection of cases, see Note (x934) 88 A. L R. 1131.
91. See RFP. S. E. C., INVEST EX. TRUSTS AND INVESTMXENT COmPANIES, PL I,
27. The company's obligation is in some instances expressly limited to an obligation to
purchase out of surplus.
92. See REP. S. E. C., suPra note gx, Pt. II, 24. They are now required so to
limit their issues by the Investment Company Act of 194o, § 18 (f) x, i5 U. S. C. A.
§ 8oa-x8 (f) x (Supp. 1940). During the period from 1927 to 1936, the forty principal
"open-end" investment companies paid $i42,ooo,ooo in redeeming their securities, which
was about one-fourth of the amount which they received from the sale of their shares
during the same period. Id. at 242.
93. See REP. S. E. C., supra note gi, PL III, c. III, 9 et seq.
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a strong tendency to induce the management to invest in securities of
that type.
It is true that, if the managers of such a company, which is faced
with a substantial number of demands for redemption, are unwilling
to liquidate part of the assets, they may borrow money for the purpose
of complying with redemption demands. However, their power to do
so has now been substantially restricted by the Investment Company
Act of 194o.94  Since their power to borrow is thus circumscribed and
their assets are of a liquid character, it is reasonably safe to permit
their managers to exercise a broad discretion in redeeming their shares,
even by the use of capital or unearned surplus.
Nevertheless, there may be considerable doubt in a number of
jurisdictions as to the legal power of investment companies to redeem
their shares out of capital or out of unearned surplus, and even as to
their power to issue such shares at all. Statutory provisions limiting
ordinary purchases of shares to purchases out of surplus or even to
purchases out of earned surplus are, as we have seen, very common
today. Modern statutes do, indeed, frequently provide specifically for
redeemable shares, and many of these statutes expressly state that such
shares may be redeemed even where no surplus exists. Such express
statutory authorizations of the issue of redeemable shares are, how-
ever, generally so phrased as to be applicable only to redeemable pre-
ferred shares and not to redeemable common shares. 5
There is a Delaware decision which construes a provision of this
sort as impliedly negativing the power to issue redeemable common
shares at all.96 There seem to be no decisions in other states constru-
ing similar statutes which authorize the creation of redeemable pre-
ferred shares and are silent with respect to the power to issue redeem-
94- Section z8 (f) i, x5 U. S. C. A. § 8oa-x8 (f) z (Supp. z94o).
9_r For statutes of this type see DEL. REV. CODE (1935) c. 65, §§ 13, 27; ME. REV.
STAT. (930) c. z6, §20; N. J. Rav. SrAT. (1937) § 14-8-3; OKLA., 18 STAT ANN.
§ x; ORE. CODE AxN. (1930), § 25-224; VA. CODE (x936) § 3792; WV. VA. CODE (1937)
§ 3034; WIs. STAr. (1937) § 182.13.
96. Starring v. American Hair & Felt Co., 191 AtI. 887 (Del. Ch. 1937), affd
mr., 2 A. (2d) 249 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1937).
Section 13 of the Delaware Act authorizes corporations to classify shares and pro-
vides that "any preferred or special stock may be made subject to redemption". Sec-
tion 27 of the same Act provides that "whenever any corporation . . . shall have
issued any preferred or special shares, it may . . . redeem all or any part of such
shares, if subject to redemption". The court in the Starring case treated § 27 as im-
pliedly forbidding the issue of common shares which are "subject to redemption" at the
option of the corporation. It is unlikely that the court would take a different view with
respect to the power of a Delaware corporation to issue common shares which are re-
deemable at the option of the holder. If the phrase "subject to redemption" includes
shares which are redeemable at the holder's option, the decision is logically applicable
to such shares. If such shares are riot regarded as "subject to redemption" within the
meaning of the statute, then there is no statutory provision explicitly authorizing the
issue of shares which are redeemable at the holder's option, even if such shares are pre-
ferred shares.
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able common shares., The objections to allowing corporations of most
types to issue redeemable common shares, and particularly common
shares which are redeemable at the option of the holder, are, however,
so serious and so self-evident that a construction of the statute which
would prevent the issue of redeemable common shares is likely to be
regarded by a court as dictated by sound policy as well as by the for-
malistic expressio unius rule of construction.
A statutory limitation of redeemable shares to redeemable pre-
ferred shares may be circumvented by forming a corporation with a
large issue of preferred shares and a merely nominal amount of com-
mon shares, so that the corporation's preferred shares will be its ordi-
nary shares. Although Section I8 (f) of the Investment Company
Act of i94o in general forbids "open-end" investment companies to
issue preferred shares, the section contains a proviso which makes it
possible for such a company to be organized in a state which does
not permit the issue of redeemable common shares. The proviso per-
mits an "open-end" company to issue preferred shares if its common
shares are entitled to no dividends except dividends in liquidation, and
if they do not amount to more than one-half of one per cent. of the
issuer's outstanding voting securities.
Although most statutes which expressly authorize the issue of
redeemable shares refer to preferred shares only, the Maryland statute
provides that any class of shares may be made redeemable either at
the option of the corporation or at the option of the holder.97 It also
contains special provisions with respect to the redemption and pur-
chase of the shares of investment companies. 98 A number of "open-
end" investment companies have been organized under this Maryland
statute and others have avoided all such corporate problems by'organiz-
ing as business trusts.99
The Investment Company Act of 1940 makes no attempt to pre-
scribe the funds which may be used by "open-end" investment com-
panies in the redemption of their shares. Since such companies are
forbidden by the Act to issue senior securities and are restricted in
their power to borrow money on bank loans,100 it is assumed that no
limitation on the use of corporate capital for the purchase of shares is
necessary. The limitations on redemption or purchase of shares by
"open-end" companies which the Act does impose are of a quite dif-
ferent sort.1°1
97. MD. ANN. CoDz, art. 23, § 42.
98. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 23, § :,4 (8).
99. See RE!. S. E. C.. supra note 9i, Pt. III, c. III, 5.
ioo. Section x8 (f), iS U. S. C. A. § 8oa-i8 (f) (Supp. 1940).
10!. Sections ii and 22, i5 U. S. C. A. § 8oa-ii and22 (Supp. 194o).
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Corporate Options to Purchase Holdings of Shareholders Who
Desire to Sell
The articles and the share certificates 102 of small corporations
(which usually issue only common shares) sometimes restrict the trans-
ferability of the shares by providing that a shareholder who desires
to sell must give the corporation the option of purchasing.- Although
shares so restricted would probably not ordinarily be referred to by
lawyers as redeemable shares, they are in fact contingently subject to
redemption at the corporation's option, since the holder cannot sell to
anyone without giving the corporation an opportunity to purchase.
It is extremely improbable that a court would construe statutes
which appear to limit the power to issue redeemable shares to that of
issuing redeemable preferred shares as invalidating options of this
sort. The exercise by the corporation of its option to buy is more
likely to be regarded as a "purchase" than as a "redemption" within
the statutory meaning of that term.103 If it is classed as a purchase
for that purpose, is it also a purchase which falls within the common
statutory prohibition of the use of capital for share purchases? There
is something to be said, as a matter of policy, for exempting the trans-
action from such restrictions. The objective of preventing the intro-
duction of strangers into these small corporations, an objective with
which the law may properly be sympathetic, is not completely attain-
able if only purchases out of surplus are legally permissible, since
the restriction on sales to others would probably be deemed an invalid
restraint on alienation if it were so phrased as to prevent a sale to
others where the corporation was legally unable to buy. On the other
hand, these small closed corporations are likely to be companies which
are engaged in active business operations that require a substantial
margin of assets over debts for the protection of both shareholders and
creditors. The dangers which are inherent in a power to reduce that
margin through the use of capital in the purchase of shares are not
eliminated by the fact that the existence of a conditional corporate.
option to purchase is disclosed by the articles of incorporation or in
the share certificates.
There has been a considerable amount of litigation with respect
to restrictions on the transfer of shares, but the cases have, in gen-
eral, dealt with the possible invalidity of such restrictions as undue
restraints on alienation rather than with the question of whether the
o2. The Uniform Stock Transfer Act provides that there shall be no restrictions
on transfer unless the Testriction is stated upon the share certificate. 6 U. L. A. § z5.
'o3. In Lawson v. Household Finance Corp., 18 Del. Ch. 343, 152 Atl. 723 (1930),
the court, in upholding such a restriction on transfer, referred to the power given to
Delaware corporations by § ig of the General Corporation Law to purchase their own
shares, and did not mention statutory restrictions on the issue of redeemable shares.
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restriction, if otherwise valid, would give the corporation the legal
power to purchase the shares out of capital. Ohio has, however, specifi-
cally provided for the purchase of shares irrespective of the existence
of surplus in cases of this sortY°4
Callable Preferred Shares
Modern preferred share contracts generally contain provisions
making the shares callable or redeemable at the option of the corpo-
ration, generally at a premium over par or over the original issue
price if the shares are no-par shares. Such provisions are likely to
prove beneficial to the common shareholders and to the enterprise as
an economic unit. They make it possible to refund an issue of pre-
ferred shares if changes in the prosperity of the enterprise or in inter-
est rates have made the dividend rate unnecessarily high, or if some
provision in the preferred shareholders' contract has proved incon-
venient. The well-informed modern investor in preferred shares ex-
pects that such shares will be made callable, and the less sophisticated
investor is adequately protected if call provisions are given sufficient
publicity at the time when the shares are being distributed.
There are strong arguments for permitting such shares to be re-
deemed out of capital. A statement in a corporation's articles that
its preferred shares are callable at its option is public notice that- the
portion of its capital represented by such shares may, if the manage-
ment so. decides, be treated as a loan to be paid off or refunded rather
than as a permanent contribution to the business. Although, gen-
erally speaking, it is unrealistic to treat the notice given by the filing
of corporate articles as though it were actual notice, in this case the
business community, creditors and investors alike, are familiar with
call provisions and regard them as normal rather than as exceptional.
A rule limiting redemption to redemption out of surplus would, if
strictly construed, prevent a prosperous corporation from retiring an
issue of preferred shares even with a view to refunding them at a lower
dividend rate, unless it had accumulated a surplus equal to the entire
anount of the issue. It would thus make it impossible to perform a
desirable refunding operation, or force the corporation to carry out the
operation in driblets.
Despite the importance, as a general rule, of safeguarding corpo-
rate capital, the requirement of such meticulous stewardship of the
"trust-fund for creditors" is scarcely necessary. The management of
our corporations is ordinarily entrusted to persons who are identified
in interest primarily with the common rather than with the preferred
1o4. 011o CODE ANx. (Throckmorton, i94o) § 8623-41.
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shareholders. The corporation's option to redeem its preferred shares
is, therefore, unlikely to be exercised unless redemption -will benefit
common shareholders, and it will scarcely do so unless the corporation
will, after paying the redemption price, have a substantial margin of
assets over liabilities. There is thus no very serious risk that redemp-
tion, even out of capital, will dangerously impair the creditors' margin
of safety. The fact that redemption must ordinarily be made at a
premium is a further safeguard against the possibility that an unpros- -
perous corporation will exercise its option to redeem.
The purchase of redeemable shares is a somewhat different mat-
ter. The preferred shares of a *corporation whose preferred divi-
dends are in arrears and are expected by investors to remain in arrears
will normally sell at a substantial discount from their liquidation price.
The less prosperous the corporation, the lower the price at which well-
informed holders of redeemable preferred shares will consent to sell
them. By using corporate capital to purchase such -shares at low prices,
the management will be able, at relatively slight cost, to eliminate
dividend and liquidation claims which have priority over those of the
common shareholders. Such a practice, phrsued on a sufficiently large
scale, may put the common shareholders in a position where even a
very slight improvement in the corporation's earnings would make it
possible to pay dividends on the common shares.105
A legal rule which permits the practice may seem a dangerous one.
It is the corporation's unprosperous state which makes it possible to
buy the preferred shares at a low price, and this same unprosperous
state will often be a sufficient reason why its financial condition should
not be changed for the worse by the expenditure of a portion of its
capital in the purchase of shares. Nevertheless, the risks involved in
granting the power to make such purchases are probably more theo-
retical than real, since, for reasons already indicated, the managers are
unlikely to make it unless they believe that it will leave the corporation
with a substantial margin of assets over liabilities. The corporations
which have most frequently engaged in this practice are the investment
companies. Such companies usually have liquid assets and few debts.
Even where they have been somewhat unsuccessful, they are still able
to use part of their capital to purchase their preferred shares without
seriously increasing their creditors' risks.
The Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on In-
vestment Trust and Investment Companies criticizes the practice of
1o5. For an illuminating account of purchases of preferred shares by investment
companies, see REP. S. E. C., supra note 9!, Pt. III, c. III, 2H1 et seq. The Report
states that, during the period 1927-1935, the ratio of repurchases to original sales of the
preferred shares of the "closed-end" management investment companies and investment-
holding companies included in the Commission's study was 37 per cent.
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purchasing the preferred shares of such companies at less than their
liquidation value from a different angle. It makes the point that such
purchases are unfair to the preferred shareholders, who thereby gen-
erally obtain much less than they would if the enterprise were liqui-
dated and the entire assets, up to the amount of their liquidation pref-
erences, were distributed to the preferred shareholders.' 06 It is clear,
however, that in this situation the preferred shareholders' difficulties
are not primarily due to the management's power to purchase the pre-
ferred shares. They are due rather to the fact that the preferred share-
holders usually have no power to compel the liquidation of the corpo-
ration, even where the assets are less than the amount of their liqui-
dation preferences, and frequently have no power to oust a manage-
ment despite its long-continued failure to declare dividends on the pre-
ferred shares. Under such ciicumstances, their only means of realiz-
ing anything on their investment is to sell their shares, either to the
corporation or to someone else, at bargain prices.
It may be that our corporation statutes should standardize the
preferred share contract to the extent of requiring that preferred share-
holders should, under certain circumstances, be empowered to elect a
majority of the directors and even to dissolve the corporation, or'that
the holders of such shares should be safeguarded by other types of
protective provisions or by some form of regulation by administrative
agencies,107 but that is another story. It may be, also, that corporate
directors and officers who are purchasing shares for the corporation
should be under the same duty of full disclosure as some courts place
upon them when they are buying shares for themselves, or that per-
sons from whom the corporation is purchasing shares should receive
some other form of protection, 08 but those are not questions peculiar
to the purchase of redeemable preferred shares.
If, instead of discussing the question at large from the stand-
point of economic and financial policy, we turn to the statutes and the
Io6. The writer of the Commission's Report apparently assumes that it is "improvi-
dent" for a senior security holder to sell at a discount where the value of the corporate
assets exceeds the liquidation price of those shares, and spggests that the fiduciary rela-
tionship between management and security holder should lead the former to seek to deter
the latter from such improvidence. REP. S. E. C., supra note 9i, Pt. III, C. III, 212. The.
preferred shareholder in a closed-end investment trust normally has no way of obtain-
ing the liquidation value of his shares if there is no market for the shares at that price,
unless the management calls the preferred issue for redemption or the common share-
holders vote to dissolve, neither of which events is likely to occur where the corpora-
tion is unsuccessful. The preferred shareholder who realizes that he is caught in a
trap and surrenders to his captors on the best terms he can get may be a maltreated
individual, but hardly an improvident one.
107. See the protective provisions for preferred shareholders required by Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, § 18, 15 U. S. C. A. §Soa-18 (Supp. 1940).
io8. Compare the restrictions imposed on all-purchases of shares by "closed-end"
investment companies by Investment Company Act of 1940, § 23, I5 U. S. C. A. § goa-23
(Supp. 194o).
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cases, we find that the situation with regard to redeemable pre-
ferred shares varies widely from state to state. In a large number of
jurisdictions, the statutes contain no provisions whatever with regard
to the issue of redeemable shares. 10 9 In this situation most courts have
held that provisions in the articles of incorporation or by-laws or
other corporate documents authorizing the issue of such shares are
entirely proper. 110 Many courts have gone further and held that, in
the absence of any statutory prohibition, such shares may be redeemed
out of the corporation's capital, provided the corporation is solvent and
will not be rendered insolvent by the payment of the redemption
price."" All or nearly all of these decisions have been made in juris-
dictions in which there were at the time no statutory or common law
limitations on the purchase of shares out of capital. If capital may be
used for ordinary purchases, it would seem to be a fortiori true that
it can be used for the 'retirement of shares described in a public docu-
ment, which is the constitution of the company, is representing tem-
porary contributions to capital that the corporation is authorized to
repay.
tog. Although this situation is less common than it was a few years ago, it still
exists in a number of important jurisdictions, including Massachusetts and New York.
iio. Consolidated Music Co. v. Brinkerhoff Piano Co., 64 F. (2d) 884 (C. C. A.
Toth, 1933) (redemption provision in articles of incorporation); Weidenfeld v. North
ern Pacific R. Co., 129 Fed. 305 (C. C. A. 8th, 1904) (same facts as Hackett case,
infra) ; Coggeshall v. Georgia Land & Inv. Co., 14 Ga. App. 637, 640, 8z S. E. 156
(1914) semnble (redemption provision in share certificate) ; Lindsay v. Arlington Co-op.
Ass'n, .86 Mass. 371, 71 N. E. 797 (1904) (co-operative association; redemption pro-
vision .n by-laws upheld); Crimmins & Peirce Co. v. Kidder Peabody Acceptance
Corp., 282 Mass. 367, i85 N. E. 383 (1933) (charter provision for redemption upheld;
statute authorized the creation of preferred shares but did not mention redemption);
Cohn v. Schultz-Costlow Co., Inc., 229 App. Div. 174, 241 N. Y. Supp. 250 (1st Dep't
593o) (foreign corporation; redemption provision in share certificate); Hackett v.
Northern Pacific R. Co., 36 Mifisc. 583, 73 N. Y. Supp. 1087 (Sup. Ct. 19O) (option
in corporation to retire its preferred shares not part of the charter but provided for by
a shareholders' resolution, embodied in reorganization agreement and inserted in the
share cerz:., cates).
iti. Nearly all of the litigation has arisen with respect to shares which are re-
deemable at the option of the holder or on a fixed date. Booth v. Union Fibre Co.,
137 Minn. 7, x62 N. W. 677 (1917) (provision in by-laws and share certificates that
preferred shares should be redeemed on a fixed date held binding on demurrer, the case
not being one "of a corporation purchasing its own stock or refunding to a shareholder
capital unconditionally contributed by him"; on trial of the case, it appeared that the
corporation was insolvent; recovery was therefore denied in Booth v. Union Fibre Co.,
142 Minn. 127. 171 N. \V. 307 (igi9)); Consolidated Music Co. v. Brinkerhoff Piano
Co., 64 F. (2d) 884 (C. C. A. oth, 1933) (judgment for the plaintiff, a preferred
shareholder who was suing on the corporation's promise to redeem, was affirmed; the
corporation was in receivership in a state court, and the opinion points out that the
judgment left the state court free to determine priorities as between the plaintiff and •
ordinary creditors); Cring v. Sheller Wood Rim Mfg. Co., 98 Ind. App. 564, 183 N. E.
674 (1932) (allegation by preferred shareholder, who was seeking to compel redemp-
tion, that redemption would leave the corporation solvent held sufficient); Crimmins
& Peirce Co. v. Kidder Peabody Acceptance Corp., 282 .Mass. 367, 185 N. E. 383 (1933)
(holders of class B preferred shares permitted to compel redemption although the
effect would be to reduce the net assets to an amount much less than the par value and
liquidation preferences of another class of preferred which was entitled to share
equally with class B in case of liquidation or dissolution) ; Starek v. Marshall-Wells
Co., 194 Minn. 564, 26I N. W. 398 (1935) (defense that redemption would prejudice
the rights of creditors not made out by proof that the capital was slightly impaired);
Ammon v. Cushman Motor Works, 128 Neb. 357, 258 N. W. 649 (1935) .semfle.
728 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
On the other hand, where the state statute forbids purchases which
impair capital, or forbids all distributions of capital to shareholders,
and is wholly silent as to the existence of a corporate power to issue
redeemable preferred shares, there is force in the contention that re-
demption out of capital is impliedly forbidden. There is a case in New
York which appears to take this view.' 12  And in Minnesota, redemp-
tion out of capital is expressly forbidden.'18
The statutes of many states do, however, specifically empower
corporations to issue preferred shares which are subject to redemp-
tion.114  Although many of these statutes are silent as to the funds
which may be used for redemption, it may well be contended that, in
the absence of any contrary implications arising out of other statutory
provisions, the phrase "redeemable shares" implies that the capital rep-
resented by those shares is retirable capital, and that accordingly such
statutes impliedly authorize the use of capital for redemption pur-
poses. 15 In a few states this argument is strengthened by language
in the section of the statute dealing with reduction of capital, which
permits redeemable shares to be retired without complying with the
formalities usually necessary for such reduction.11s
In several states, including a number of the more important juris-
dictions, the use of capital for redemption is explicitly authorized.
112. In Greene v. Boardman, 143 Misc. 201, 203, 256 N. Y. Supp. 34o, r3 (Sup.
Ct. 1932), aff'd mein., 24o App. Div. 75, 265 N. Y. Supp. 965 (3d Dep't 1933), the use
of capital to retire preferred shares was treated as a violation of § 58 of the New York.
Stock Corporation Law, which forbids distributions of capital to shareholders, but the
court does not explicitly state that the preferred shares were made redeemable by their
terms.
113. 3 MINN. STAT. (Mason, i94o Supp.) § 7492-21-VL
114. See the statutes cited in note 95, supra. Cf. Ky. STAT. AlN. (Baldwin, 1936)
§564-1, providing that a corporation may give each class of shares "such priority of
right . . . in the redemption of the shares as may be prescribed in the rules and
regulations adopted by the shareholders"; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1938) tit. 15,
§ 2852-602, recognizes the propriety of issuing redeemable shares by providing that
there may be variations between different series of shares of the same class as to vari-
ous matters, including "the price at, and the terms and conditions on, which shares may
be redeemed".
1i5. Thus in Kentucky the courts, relying to some extent on the statute referred
to in note 114, smpra, have held that a solvent corporation must perform its contract
to redeem even though its capital is impaired. Westerfield-Bonte Co. v. Burnett, 176
Ky. i88, 195 S. W. 477 (1917) ; F. T. Gunther Grocery Co. v. Hazel, 179 Ky. 775, 2o
S. W. 336 (ig98).
116. See CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) tit. 35, § 345, providin- that preferred shares
may be subject to redemption", and § 3425, stating that "the provisions of law con-
cerning reduction of capital stock and concerning a corporation acquiring its own stock
shall not apply to the retirement of preferred stock" if the method of retirement is set
forth in a certificate filed in the office of the secretary of state; NEV. CoxtP. LAws
(Hillyer, i92) § 1624, as amended by L. 1939, c. 196, permitting corporations to
reduce their capital -without complying with the usual formalities required for such
reduction, where the reduction is effected "by redeeming or purchasing preferred or
special shares subject to redemption at not exceeding the price or prices at which the
same may be redeemed"; TF.NN. CODE (Michie, 1938) § 3724, providing that all classes
of shares may be made subject to redemption, and § 3736, providing for reduction of
capital "by redeeming shares subject to redemption in the manner and not to exceed
the consideration stated in the certificate of incorporation".
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Some of the statutes provide that such redemption cannot be made if
the assets remaining would be insufficient to pay the debts,117 or if
there would be reasonable ground for believing that such redemption
would make it impossible for the corporation to pay its debts as they
fall due.11 A few, including that of Pennsylvania, add a restriction
against the use of capital for redemption purposes if the remaining
assets would be insufficient to cover both the debts and the liquidation
preferences of any shares which are entitled on dissolution to priority
over or equality with the shares which are to be redeemed. 119 Under
some of these statutory provisions, it would seem legally possible to
use capital for the payment of the redemption premium as well as for
the payment of the par value of the redeemed shares.
A number of modem statutes negative the latter possibility by
providing that, after redemption, the remaining assets must equal the
debts plus that part of the capital which has not been retired by means
of the redemption, 120 or, as in Pennsylvania,' 2 that only the amount
of capital which is represented by the shares to be redeemed may be
used for that purpose. 122  There is perhaps no very serious danger
that corporate managements will use capital to pay premiums in con-
nection with redemption of preferred shares where the circumstances
are such that to do so would be seriously detrimental to the interests
of creditors, the shareholders, or the enterprise as a whole. But it
accords with sound accounting principles to insist that a corporation
cannot lawfully engage in a redemption operation by which it expends
a larger amount of its capital funds than the amount of capital liability
which is written off by the retirement of the redeemed shares.
Some of the statutes specifically provide that redeemable shares
may be purchased at not more than their redemption price and that
capital may be used for such purchases to the same extent as for re-
117. W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie & Sublett, 1937) § 3052. Similar provisions
exist in some states which in addition impose restri-tions on the amoun't of capital, per
share, which may be used for redemption. DEL. REV. CODE (1935) c. 65, §27; KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. (Corrick, Supp. 1939) § 17-3220; MICH. STAT. ANN. (Henderson,
1936) c. i5, § 21.37. Cf. O1U CODE ANN. (Throckmorton, i94o) § 8623-41 (forbid-
ding redemption if there is "reasonable ground for believing that the corporation is
unable, or by such purchase may be rendered unable, to satisfy its liabilities").
ix8. CAL. Crv. CODE (Deering, 1937) § 342; Illinois, 5 Josras STAT. ANN. § 32.os8;
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1938) tit. i5, § 2852-705. All of these statutes contain addi-
tional restrictions.
119. See the California, Illinois, and Pennsylvania statutes cited in note 118 supra.
120. MD. ANN. CODE (Flack, '939) art 23, § 54; NVAsH. REV. STAT. ANN. (Rem-
ington, x932) §38o3-4o2.
12r. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1938) tit. i5, §2852-7o5.
122. DEiL REL- CODE (1935) c. 65, § 27 (a substantially similar but more elaborate
provision); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Corrick, Supp. 1939) § 17-3220 (similar to Dela-
ware) ; LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Dart, 1939) § 1125; MIcE. STAT. ANN. (Henderson,
1936) c. 15, § 2137; Mo. STAT. ANN. (1932) §4952c; N. J. STAT. ANN, (1939) tit. 14,
18-3.
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demption.123 Even in the absence of such provisions, it is unlikely
that a court would hold that a corporation which is authorized by law
to call its shares for redempti6n at $i io a share and to use its capital
in that operation to the extent of $ioo a share, cannot lawfully expend
the same or a lesser amount of capital in purchasing the same shares
from holders who are willing to sell them. 12'
Compulsorily Redeemable Preferred Shares
From the standpoint of the corporation, preferred shares are
compulsorily redeemable not only when the corporation promises to
redeem them at a fixed date or on the happening of a contingency, but
also when it gives the holder an option to demand redemption. Of
these various types of redemption provisions, those which make the
shares redeemable at the holder's option are both the most common
and the most objectionable. The holder of such shares will be most
likely to exercise his option to demand the return of his capital if he
believes the corporation is unsuccessful. A corporation which has
such shares outstanding is, therefore, subject to the burden of having
to pay out part of its capital under circumstances where to do so may
be highly detrimental to the fortunes of the enterprise and extremely
injurious to the interests of the creditors and to the holders of other
classes of shares. Even though such provisions are generally held to
be unenforceable where the corporation is actually insolvent, they
nevertheless have a strong tendency to compel an unsuccessful enter-
prise to enfeeble itself still further through repayment of part of its
capital. However tolerable where the corporation is an investment
company whose business is merely to purchase and hold a pool of
liquid securities, 125 such provisions are loaded with dynamite when
made use of in the financing of industrial enterprises which cannot
123. CAL. CIv. CODE (Deering, 1937) § 342 (5); Dri. REV. CODE (1935) c. 6_, §27
(applicable also to the purchase of preferred shares which are not subject to redemp-
tion); MD. AN-. CoDE (Flack, 1939) art. 23, § 54 (2) (7); Mo. STAT. ANN. (1932)
§ 4952C (similar to Delaware); W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie & Sublett, 1937) §3034
(probably applicable to the purchase of preferred shares which are not subject to re-
demption).
iz4. The Michigan legislature has, however, made a distinction" between the re-
demption and the purchase of redeemable shares, permitting the capital to be used for
the former purpose but not for the latter. MICH. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, 1936) c. x,
§ 21.37.
125. The effect of the Investment Company Act of i94o is to permit management
investment companies to issue shares which are redeemable at the option of the holder
only where the company has no more than one class of shares, thus making it legally
impossible for such companies to issue preferred shares which are redeemable at the
holder's option. This results from the combined effect of § 5, which classifies a com-
pany that issues "any redeemable security" as an "open-end" company, § 2 (a) 3!,
which provides that "redeemable security" means a security which entitled the holder
to present it to the issuer and receive approximately his share of the net assets or their
cash equivalent, and § 18 (f), which forbids "open-end" companies, with minor excep-
tions, to issue senior securities.
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function successfully if a substantial part of their capital is subject to
sudden withdrawal. It is immaterial that, where redemption provisions
of this sort are part of the corporation's charter, the common share-
holders have in theory assented to them and that the creditors have
constructive notice of them. The day has passed when it is possible
to take seriously the argument that the legislature, without whose aid
business corporations cannot exist, should sanction wholly unsound
methods of financing them, merely because those whose interests are
most directly involved are put on notice that such methods have been
used.
Preferred shares which are redeemable at the option of the holder
are dangerous to the corporation, its creditors, and the holders of
other classes of its shares. They are objectionable for the further
reason that they are likely to mislead the person who purchases the
redeemable shares. Although they purport to entitle the shareholder
to demand his money at any time, the courts, properly insisting that
a fundamental rule of corporation law prevents shareholders from
competing with creditors in cases of corporate insolvency, have held
that they cannot be enforced against insolvent corporations.
Unfortunately, the investor most likely to invest in the shares
of corporations whose preferred stock is so difficult to sell that it needs
window dressing of this kind is the sort of person who cannot easily
be made to understand that an apparently absolute promise of repay-
ment is subject to legal restrictions based on the nature of shareholder-
ship as a proprietary rather than a creditor interest. Out of regard
for the interests of the preferred shareholder himself, as well as those
of the corporation and its creditors, the issue of such shares should,
therefore, be made illegal, and adequate measures should be taken by
blue-sky commissions or other appropriate public bodies to prevent
shares purporting to create redemption rights of this sort from getting
into the hands of the public. 126  Although shares which are redeem-
able at a fixed date or on a contingency are not quite as injurious as
shares which are redeemable at the option of the holder, they are sub-
ject to much the same objections and should not be permitted. An
126. See Koeppler v. Crocker Chair Co., 200 Wis. 476, 483, 484, 228 N. W. I3O
(I93O). Even where there is no statute making such shares illegal, a blue-sky com-
mission which, like that of Michigan, has power to refuse a license to sell securities
"where it appears to the commission that the sale of such securities would work a
fraud, deception or imposition on purchasers or on the public, or that the proposed
disposal of the securities is on unfair terms", 'Micn. Co.\tp. LAWS (Mason, Supp.
I94o) § 9780, might refuse to permit such shares to be issued without an explicit state-
ment in the prospectus that redemption rights are subordinate to the claims of creditors
in case of insolvency, or might even deem itself authorized to refuse to permit them. to
be issued at all. The full disclosure requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U. S. C. A. § 77a ct seq. (Supp. 194o), might also affect the situation.
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exception may well be made in the case of shares which are to be
redeemed out of a sinking fund to be set up out of earnings.
It is to be regretted that not more than two or three states have
expressly forbidden the issue of shares of these types.' 2 7  It is con-
ceivable that the phrase "subject to redemption", which is very com-
monly used in statutes authorizing the issue of preferred shares, might
be held to apply only to shares that subject the holder to the risk of
having his shares redeemed against his will 128 and thus not to sanction
the issue of shares that give the holder the privilege of demanding the
return of his investment. The question is, however, unlikely to arise
except in the case in which shares which purport to grant the holder an
option to redeem have been issued and purchased by confiding investors.
Under these circumstances, it is improbable that a court would feel
justified in resting a decision invalidating the redemption provision on,
so tenuous a ground. Moreover, in a few states, the legislature has
expressly authorized both the issue of shares of this type and the use
of corporate capital in the performance of the corporation's promise
to redeem them.
129
Nearly all of the litigation with respect to compulsorily redeem-
able shares has arisen in jurisdictions in which there are no statutory
restrictions either on the issue of such shares or on the funds which
are available for the performance of the redemption agreement. As
has been previously stated, the courts are unanimous in holding that
such agreements are enforceable only if the corporation is solvent at
the time when the option to redeem is exercised. 130 The existence of
127. CAL CIv. CODE (Deering, 1937) § 294, provides that any right of redemption
shall be exercisable at the option of the corporation only, except that provision may be
made for the compulsory redemption of shares out of a sinking fund accumulated out
of net earnings. FLA. Comp. LAws ANN. (Skillman, 1927) § 6535, provides that
shares "may be subject to such rights of redemption rescrvcd to the corporation as may
be stated" in the certificate of incorporation.
128. Compare the construction given to the redemption provisions of a Michigan
statute, since repealed, in Ellsworth v. Lyons, i8i Fed. 55, 59 (C. C. A. 6th, i9go).
129. MD. A-N. CODE (Flack, z939) art. 23, §42; OHIO CODE ANN. (Throckmor-
ton, 1940) § 8623-4.
13o. For cases refusing to allow a holder of redeemable shares to recover the re-
demption price from an insolvent corporation or one not shown to be solvent, see
Spencer v. Smith, 201 Fed. 647 (C. C. A. 8th. 1912) (corporation bankrupt) ; Rider
v. Delker & Sons Co., r45 Ky. 634, 140 S. W. 1011 (191u) (corporation insolvent;
petition by holder of redeemable shares for receiver denied) ; Booth v. Union Fibre Co.,
142 Minn. 127, 171 N. W. 307 (1919) (corporation insolvent though not in liquidation) ;
Koeppler v. Crccker Chair Co., 200 Wis. 476, 228 N. W. 130 (1930) (burden on share-
holder demanding redemption to show that assets exceed liabilities). See Warren v.
Queen & Co., 240 Pa. 154, i6o, 87 Atl. 595 (93)."
In Ellsworth v. Lyons, 181 Fed. 55 (C. C. A. 6th, 19io), a solvent corporation took
out an insurance policy on the life of its president for the purpose of providing a fund
for the retirement of its preferred shares, and, while still solvent, paid the premiums on
the policy. The court held that the corporation's trustee in bankruptcy and not the
preferred shareholders were entitled to the cash surrender value of the policy. But cf.
Tweedie Footwear Corp. v. Fonville, u5 S. V. (2d) 421 (Tex. Civ. App. i938).
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such a rule makes it necessary to distinguish sharply between instru-
ments creating redeemable preferred shares and instruments creating
indebtedness. Unhappily, the distinction is one which is often difficult
to make, since it is a'not uncommon practice for corporations to issue
securities in which the ordinary attributes of debt and of shareholder-
ship are blended together, perhaps for the very purpose of enabling
the holder to claim shareholder's rights if the enterprise prospers and
creditor's rights if it does not. A majority of the courts have tended
to resolve such ambiguities in favor of shareholdership. 131
Difficult questions arise where the corporation, although solvent
at the time when the right of redemption accrues, becomes insolvent
before payment is made. If the shares are redeemable on demand,
can a creditor status, which will enable a former shareholder to prove
with other creditors against a company which is now bankrupt or
insolvent, be acquired by making demand, by bringing suit, by re-
covering judgment,132 or by receiving the corporation's bond or
promissory note,133 provided that the corporation was still solvent
when these events occurred? If the shares are to be redeemed on a
fixed date, does their owner automatically become a creditor on that
date without any action on his part, if the corporation is still solvent
at that time but later becomes insolvent? 134
131. Mathews v. Bradford, 70 F. (2d) 77 (C. C. A. 6th, i934); In re Hicks-
Fuller Co., 9 F. (2d) 492 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925) ; Hazel Atlas Glass Co. v. Van Dyk
& Reeves, Inc., 8 F. (2d) 716 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925); Armstrong v. Union Trust & Sav-
ings Bank, 248 Fed. 268 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918) ; Spencer v. Smith, 201 Fed. 647 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1912) ; Ellsworth v. Lyons, i8i Fed. 55 (C. C. A. 6th. i91o); Young v. Lyons
Milling Co., 124 Kan. 83, 256 Pac. 717 (I927) ; Booth v. Union Fibre Co., 142.Minn.
127, 171 N. W. 307 (i919). But cf. Savannah Real Estate, etc., Co. v. Silverburg,
1o8 Ga. 281, 33 S. E. go8 (i899); Best v. Oklahoma Mill Co., 12 Okla. 135, 253 Pac.
1005 (1926). See Uhlman, The Law of Hybrid Securities (1938) WASH. U. L. Q. 182.
132. The question of the erfect of obtaining such a judgment was left open in Van-
den Bosch v. Michigan Trust Co., 35 F. (2d) 643 (C. C. A. 6th, I929).
133. In In re Phoenix Hotel Co., 83 F. (2d) 724 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936), ccrt. denied,
2W U. S. 568 (1936), a Kentucky corporation issued preferred shares convertible into
bonds, such shares being provided for by statute. The shareholders later demanded
and received bonds in exchange for their shares, and some time later the rnrporation
filed a reorganization petition under § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act. The court held
that the claims of the bondholders should be postponed to those of persons who had
lent credit to the corporation prior to the conversion. The decision was based in part
on a statute providing that the rights of creditors should not be lessened by a decrease
in the capital stock of any corporation.
But cf. Campbell v. Grant Trust & Savings Co., 97 Ind. App. i69, 182 N. E. 267
(1932), in which the claim of one who had exchanged his redeemable shares for the
corporation's note was held valid in the subsequent receivership of the corporation, the
court relying to some extent on the fact that the record did not show the existence of
any creditors whose claims antedated the giving of the note.
The Investment Company Act of i94o, § i8e, forbids any company subject to that
Act to issue a senior security which represents indebtedness for the purpose of refund-
ing any senior security which is a stock.
134. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has twice answered this
question in the negative. Vanden Bosch v. Michigan Trust Co., 35 F. (2d) 643 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1929), cited note 132, supra; Mathews v. Bradford, 70 F. (2d) 77 (C. C. A.
6th, 1934), cited note 131, Supra.
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There are a number of decisions on these and similar questions,
some of which have given rise to a considerable amount of adverse
criticism.' 3 " For reasons similar to those which have been stated in
the portion of this article which deals with purchase of shares, the
writer's inclination would be to deny the preferred shareholder's claim
to equality with the creditors in all of these situations. The controversy
is, however, one in which it seems wise to remain, if not strictly neutral,
at least non-belligerent. If the law permits business corporations to
spawn financial cats and dogs, it will be faced with difficult problems
in attempting to weigh the claims of the unfortunate shareholder who
has been sold a pup, against those of the creditor who insists that he
is in danger of being bitten unless the pup is given a dose of chloro-
form. What is needed is not a formula for adjudicating such dis-
putes, but an efficient method of preventing the breeding and sale of
these animals. Investment companies with liquid assets and few debts
may properly be permitted to issue shares which are redeemable at the
option of the holder but an enlightened system of corporation law
would not allow corporations which are engaged in active business
operations to court financial disaster by obtaining their capital on such
terms.
135. See Jones, Redcemable Corporate Securities (1931) 5 So. CALIF. L. REV. 83;
Note (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 888; Note (1930) 28 MicH. L. REv. 888.
